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Article 5

JUDICIAL CANDIDATES’ RIGHT TO LIE
NAT STERN
A large majority of state judges are chosen through some form
of popular election. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,
the Supreme Court struck down a law forbidding certain judicial
campaign speech. A decade later, the Court in United States v.
Alvarez ruled that factually false statements do not constitute categorically unprotected expression under the First Amendment. Together, these two holdings, along with the Court’s wider protection
of political expression and disapproval of content-based restrictions, cast serious doubt on states’ ability to ban false and misleading speech by judicial candidates. Commonly known as the
misrepresent clause, this prohibition has intuitive appeal in light
of judges’ responsibilities and still exists in many states. Given the
provision’s vulnerability to challenge, however, states may be able
to avert chronic fabrication by judicial candidates only by removing its ultimate source—judicial elections themselves.
“If the State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power
of the democratic process, it must accord the participants in that
process . . . the First Amendment rights that attach to their roles.”1
“[A] State’s decision to elect its judiciary does not compel it to
treat judicial candidates like campaigners for political office.”2
INTRODUCTION
It is virtually axiomatic that political candidates can lie with legal impunity.3 At the same time, the scheme of separation of powers and intuitions
© 2018 Nat Stern.
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1. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
2. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015).
3. This phenomenon is perhaps most vividly illustrated by campaigns for the Nation’s highest
office. See THOMAS E. PATTERSON, OUT OF ORDER 3–27 (1993); see also KATHLEEN HALL
JAMIESON, PACKAGING THE PRESIDENCY: A HISTORY AND CRITICISM OF PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING 408 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing a campaign ad that misquoted candidate’s
opponent as saying, “nonproliferation of the control of nuclear weapons is none of our business”);
Callum Borchers, Why the New York Times Decided It Is Now Okay to Call Donald Trump a Liar,

774

2018]

JUDICIAL CANDIDATES’ RIGHT TO LIE

775

about justice point to a higher standard for those seeking election to judicial
office. Accordingly, laws in twenty-two states contain a “misrepresent
clause” barring deliberately false factual statements by judicial candidates.4
The Supreme Court’s decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,5
however, casts doubt on whether states may regulate judicial candidates’
speech. While striking down only a single provision of Minnesota’s restrictions on judicial campaign speech, White evoked much speculation about

WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/09/22/whythe-new-york-times-decided-it-is-now-okay-to-call-donald-trump-a-liar/ (pointing to candidate’s
repeated claims that the President was not born in the United States);LARRY J. SABATO, FEEDING
FRENZY 102–03 (1991) (discussing candidate’s lying about his age); Martin Schram, Nation’s
Longest Campaign Comes to an End, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 1980), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/11/04/nations-longest-campaign-comes-to-an-end/6baf110a2aa6-4c26-aa92-6434c60e138e/ (noting candidate’s assertion that trees cause more pollution than
automobiles). The First Amendment status of laws barring false statements by political candidates
is discussed infra Part I.A.
4. ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7.B(2) (2004), http://judicial.alabama.gov/library/rules/can7.pdf; ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(iii) (2011),
http://www.courtrecords.alaska.gov/webdocs/rules/docs/cjc.pdf; ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT
r.
4.3
(2009),
http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/137/rules/Arizona%20Code%20of%20Judicial%20Conduct.pdf; FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
7(A)(3)(e)(ii) (2015), http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/ethics/Code_Judicial_Conduct.pdf; ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 67 (1994), https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/jib/documents/code%20of%20judicial%20conduct.pdf; KY. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.300, Canon
5(B)(1)(c) (2015); MD. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.4(d)(5) (2016); MISS. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(iii) (2002), https://courts.ms.gov/rules/msrulesofcourt/code_of_judicial_conduct.pdf; MO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2-4.2(A)(5) (2012),
https://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/ClerkHandbooksP2RulesOnly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/34f3bee06088a0fe86256ca6005212
35?OpenDocument; N.H. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.2 (2011); N.M. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT r. 21-402(A)(2)(d) (2015); N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7.C(3) (2015);
N.D. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(iii) (2012); OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 4, r. 4.3 (2017), http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/conduct/judcond0309.pdf; OKLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(iii) (2010); R.I.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(iii) (2017); S.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(iii) (2017); S.D. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2013); TEX.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(1)(ii) (2002), http://www.txcourts.gov/media/514728/TXCodeOfJudicialConduct_20020822.pdf; VT. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(B)(4)(c)
(2011),
https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/sites/default/files/documents/Text_of_A.O._10_Vt_Code_of_Judicial_Conduct.REFORMATTED.pdf; WIS. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 60.06(3)(c) (2010), https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/scrule/DisplayDocument.html?content=html&seqNo=27626; WYO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.2(B)(6) (2009),
http://judicialconduct.wyo.gov/home/how-to-file-a-complaint/wyoming-code-of-judicial-conduct.
In addition, California directs a judicial candidate to “take appropriate corrective action if the candidate learns of any misrepresentations made in his or her campaign statements or materials.” CAL.
CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5(B)(2) (2016).
5. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). The case is discussed infra Part II.B.
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the potential invalidation of a broader swathe of such codes.6 Notwithstanding this ominous outlook, though, the misrepresent clause was generally
thought to be relatively secure from First Amendment challenge.7
Contrary to such sanguine assessments, this Article argues that states’
attempts to bar falsehoods by judicial candidates stand on tenuous footing
and are probably unconstitutional. Of course, this interpretation does not imply moral endorsement of the dishonesty that some who aspire to judicial
office may practice. Indeed, it does not even assume the wisdom of selecting
judges through popular vote; cogent arguments have been offered against this
peculiarly American institution.8 Rather, the thesis presented here reflects
the extent to which the Court has shielded false expression and imported
stringent protection of political speech into the judicial setting.
Part I of this Article examines principles that appear to afford broad protection to falsehoods by judicial candidates.9 Of particular note is the Court’s
6. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 208–09 (2004); Katherine A. Moerke, Must More Speech Be the
Solution to Harmful Speech? Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 48
S.D. L. REV. 262, 291–310 (2003); Roy A. Schotland, Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?,
39 CT. REV. 8, 9–10 (2002); Nat Stern, The Looming Collapse of Restrictions on Judicial Campaign
Speech, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 63, 111–29 (2008); Developments in the Law—Voting and Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1134 (2006) (stating “the future looks bleak” for advocates of
campaign speech restrictions); see also infra note 275 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 6, at 221–22 (“Even if the Misrepresentations Clause does
trigger strict scrutiny, the interest in informed electoral decision making is a compelling one and
ought to justify such a restriction on candidate speech.”); Moerke, supra note 6, at 263 (“[T]he
future of the misrepresent clause is the brightest of all.”); id. at 310–12; Schotland, supra note 6, at
9–10 (omitting misrepresent clause from enumeration of provisions likely to face legal challenge);
Walter M. Weber, Judicial Campaign Speech Restrictions: Some Litigation Nuts and Bolts, 68 ALB.
L. REV. 635, 645 (2005) (describing misrepresent clause as “unassailable” as applied to provably
false assertions); see also Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and
the Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563 (2004) (arguing in wake of
White that availability of disqualification renders most or all restrictions on truthful campaign
speech unconstitutional).
8. See infra notes 227–241 and accompanying text.
9. This reasoning applies only to restrictions aimed specifically at judicial candidates. Candidates’ speech is not, of course, immune from valid general prohibitions on certain kinds of falsity:
for example, defamation. Further, this Article does not discuss whether a state could specifically
bar misrepresentations by sitting judges seeking reelection under canons of judicial conduct. As a
preliminary observation, however, such a ban would still raise serious concerns. While the state
generally exercises greater control over speech within its own sphere—see, for example, Garcetti
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)—the constitutional vulnerabilities of the limitations on judicial
campaign speech discussed in this Article—especially those arising out of the protection of political
speech, see infra Part I.A.2—would still apply. In addition, disadvantaging one party in a political
contest would presumably trigger the First Amendment’s heightened skepticism of content discrimination. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447–49 (1991). Particularly apposite
here is the Court’s admonition that the state “has no . . . authority to license one side of a debate to
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.” R.A.V., 505 U.S.
at 392; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994) (“[L]aws favoring some
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holding in United States v. Alvarez,10 which rejected the contention that factually false statements categorically receive no First Amendment recognition.11 Part II traces states’ widespread adoption of judicial elections, limitations on judicial campaign speech enacted to counter threats to due process
posed by candidates’ appeals to the electorate, and the reasoning in White
that called such restrictions into question. Part III is the heart of the Article.
It describes how specific themes emerging from authority discussed in the
first two parts militate against the misrepresent clause. Finally, Part IV explains how two Court decisions that might be seen as bolstering the misrepresent clause—Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.12 and Williams-Yulee v.
Florida Bar13—are better viewed as discrete rulings designed to address exceptional circumstances.
I. THE IMMUNITY OF FALSE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH
The Supreme Court has issued no comprehensive doctrine to govern
false statements by political candidates. This reticence is perhaps understandable in an area where two profound interests—shielding political discourse from factual distortion14 and protecting that discourse from government interference—can collide.15 Still, Court rulings and pronouncements in
this area tilt decidedly in favor of campaign speech unhampered by official
arbitration of the truth. Ultimately, the controlling principle appears to be
that “[t]he State’s fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not
provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting speech.”16

speakers over others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature’s speaker preference reflects a content preference. . . .”).
10. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
11. Id. at 721–22.
12. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
13. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
14. The impact that manufactured stories can have on political campaigns was highlighted by
the unusual incidence of “fake news” during the 2016 presidential campaign. See Elizabeth
Dwoskin et al., Why Facebook and Google Are Struggling to Purge Fake News, WASH. POST (Nov.
15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/why-facebook-and-google-arestruggling-to-purge-fake-news/2016/11/15/85022897-f765-422e-9f53-c720d1f20071_story.html.
15. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982) (“States have a legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of their electoral processes. . . . But when a State seeks to uphold that interest
by restricting speech, the limitations on state authority imposed by the First Amendment are manifestly implicated.”); Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 199 (While
political candidates’ lies “pose . . . harms to their listeners . . . and may also . . . undermine public
confidence in the integrity of the political process,” laws forbidding such lies “threaten significant
First Amendment harms because they regulate expression in a context in which we especially fear
government overreaching and partisan abuse. . . .”).
16. Brown, 456 U.S. at 60.
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A. The Costs of False Political Campaign Speech and of Its Regulation
The state possesses the authority to restrict false factual statements on a
range of subjects as well as the grounds for asserting that power to combat
the corrosive effects of political candidates’ lies. Nevertheless, this authority
is circumscribed by core First Amendment principles. Most conspicuously,
the extreme solicitude long given to political debate resists holding candidates legally accountable for their misrepresentations.
1. Grounds for Prohibition
Numerous restrictions on factually false assertions have long been accepted as compatible with the First Amendment’s protection of speech. The
roster of false expression that government proscribes includes fraud,17 perjury,18 false advertising,19 misrepresentation of material facts to the government,20 impersonation of a government official,21 misrepresentation of material facts in connection with the sale or purchase of securities,22 and
defamation.23 Though some degree of mental culpability has typically been
required to impose sanctions, government’s power to ban these kinds of falsehoods has been firmly recognized.24
The rationale for permitting suppression of such expression is essentially twofold. First, unlike everyday lies and deceptions that could be considered innocuous or even beneficial,25 the types of falsity that the government has the right to forbid inflict self-evident or demonstrable harm. An
17. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); ALA. CODE § 6-5-101 (LexisNexis 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-16-6 (LexisNexis 2014).
18. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-502 (West 2013); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-10-70 (2011).
19. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
20. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
21. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2012).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
23. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-11-1 (2016); Elliott v. Murdock, 385 P.3d 459, 465 (Idaho
2016); Rice v. Alley, 791 A.2d 932, 936 (Me. 2002).
24. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003)
(sustaining state law banning fraud where State was required to show that “defendant made the
representation with the intent to mislead the listener”); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
193 (1976) (permitting private cause of action for damages under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 where plaintiff can show defendant’s “intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud”).
25. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 733 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing
that “in social contexts,” false factual statements may, inter alia, “prevent embarrassment, protect
privacy, . . . or preserve a child’s innocence”); United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 673–75 (9th
Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (reciting extensive catalogue of “white lies, exaggerations
and deceptions,” that serve various social purposes), aff’d, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). For the view that
some types of lies—for example, “investigative deception”—warrant protection because they further the aims of freedom of speech, see Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly
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obvious instance is securities fraud, where a false or misleading statement or
omission induces a buyer or seller to incur monetary loss; indeed, a showing
of damages is requisite to recovery.26 Even an injury like the offense that
perjury gives to the integrity of the justice system,27 which might appear
somewhat more abstract, also involves thwarting a court’s concrete goal of
basing its judgment on accurate information.28
In addition, the harms produced by proscribable speech do not lend
themselves to the First Amendment’s normal corrective of open debate. Justice Holmes famously articulated the preference for the metaphorical marketplace over official arbitration as a means of seeking truth:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas—[and] that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .29
As the Court has pointed out, however, false statements “interfere with
the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas.”30 Moreover, it is in
the nature of falsehoods that the state may bar that counterspeech will not
suffice to cure their impact. In many instances, the deception may go undetected before it causes serious or even irreparable harm. Thus, government
may require sellers and advertisers to provide information that is not false or
misleading rather than leave consumers to discover products’ flaws through
second-hand reports or personal experience.31 In other instances, even
prompt exposure may fail to avert or redress the injury. The law of libel, for

Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1454–56 (2015). See also Norton, supra
note 15, at 164–68.
26. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754–55 (1975).
27. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993).
28. See In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945). The requirement of harm as a crucial element
in the power to suppress false speech is discussed in the analysis of United States v. Alvarez, 567
U.S. 709 (2012), infra Part I.B.
29. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989) (“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies, to avert the [feared] evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence.” (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring))); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
72 YALE L.J. 877, 881 (1963) (stating as a principle justification for free expression that it is “the
best process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth”).
30. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
31. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
n.24 (1976).
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example, rests largely on the assumption that the taint of defamatory falsehood may persist in the face of even cogent rebuttal.32
The rationales for permitting government to prohibit certain species of
false statements might be thought to apply to political candidates’ misrepresentations.33 Given the sharp constraint imposed by an election date, the marketplace of information may literally not have time to dispel false statements.34 The definite date of a campaign’s close provides incentive for
issuing misinformation at a point where the candidate attacked cannot effectively counter the false claim.35 Moreover, the capacity of modern media to
bombard citizens with factual misstatements may “normalize” falsity to such
an extent that many cannot distinguish it from truth.36
The effects of pervasive false campaign speech can be devastating, for
they strike at the core premises of representative democracy.37 Most obvious
is the degradation and distortion of electoral discourse. One need not subscribe to a romanticized view of the nation’s earliest political campaigns38 to

32. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974) (“[T]he law of defamation
is rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie.”).
33. As used here, the term “misrepresentation” does not encompass campaign promises that
are not fulfilled after the candidate attains office. Since it is impossible to objectively gauge the
candidate’s intent at the time the promise was made, the statement would not be susceptible to
objective refutation. See Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300, 303 (8th Cir. 1988) (statement about plaintiff’s motive treated as protected by the First Amendment); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
552 P.2d 425, 430 (Cal. 1976) (same); see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20
(1990) (“[A] statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be
liability under state defamation law, at least . . . where a media defendant is involved.”). Even if
the threshold for determining falsity were lowered, its demonstration would occur far too late for
effective enforcement.
34. See Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1751, 1765 (1999) (“[T]he precise and temporal nature of an election places a premium on
rules that promote careful and considered choice, a fair and effective electoral process, and a politically legitimate result.”).
35. See William A. Williams, A Necessary Compromise: Protecting Electoral Integrity
Through the Regulation of False Campaign Speech, 52 S.D. L. REV. 321, 351 (2007) (describing
this as a tactic of “the opportunistic liar”).
36. See Xiaoyan Qiu et al., Limited Individual Attention and Online Virality of Low-Quality
Information, NATURE HUMAN BEHAVIOR, June 26, 2017, at 1.
37. See Lee Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the “Actual Malice” Standard, 82
TUL. L. REV. 889, 895–97, 913–14 (2008).
38. See, e.g., Libby Copeland, Stuck in the Muck, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/12/AR2008101201966.html (discussing the presidential contest of 1800 between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams).
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credit the Framers with envisioning that representatives to the national government would be chosen through informed, rational debate.39 False campaign assertions, typically against an opponent, vitiate that model.40 Moreover, attack ads of this nature can dominate campaigns, and not only because
of their efficacy.41 In addition, even candidates who would not have initiated
such attacks may feel compelled to respond in kind lest their opponents succeed in defining them in negative terms.42 The resulting barrage thus diverts
campaigns from discussion of substantive issues.43 At least partly because of
this unhealthy allocation of time and resources, the most visible media in turn
tend to neglect these issues.44
Of course, the ultimate damage that false campaign speech inflicts is not
simply pollution of a high-minded ideal of political debate. Rather, dissemination of misinformation to the voting public threatens to defeat the very
promise of democratic self-government. The success of this system depends
on the ability of citizens to make reasoned choices about the alternative visions they are offered. Citizens who make these selections based on factually
false beliefs are more likely to choose poor policies and inferior candidates.45
Further, frequent false or deceptive claims by candidates and their supporters generate subtler but profound harms transcending the outcome of a
given election. Repeated exposure to such claims may breed attitudes that
erode the robust citizen engagement on which democracy thrives. Citizens

39. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 344 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009);
see also William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 285, 294 (2004) (“Democracy is premised on an informed electorate.”).
40. See Marshall, supra note 39, at 294 (“[T]o the extent that false ads misinform the voters,
they interfere with the process upon which democracy is based.”).
41. See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, Opinion, Americans—Especially but Not Exclusively Trump
Voters—Believe Crazy, Wrong Things, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/rampage/wp/2016/12/28/americans-especially-but-not-exclusively-trump-voters-believe-crazy-wrong-things/.
42. See Gerald G. Ashdown, Distorting Democracy: Campaign Lies in the 21st Century, 20
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1085, 1092–93 (2012) (explaining “the risk of being ‘Willie Hortoned’
or ‘Swift-boated’” in the absence of a response).
43. See Louis A. Day, Political Advertising and the First Amendment, in POLITICAL
COMMUNICATION 39, 41 (Robert Mann & David D. Perlmutter eds., 2011); Peter F. May, Note,
State Regulation of Political Broadcast Advertising: Stemming the Tide of Deceptive Negative Attacks, 72 B.U. L. REV. 179, 179 (1992); see also Marshall, supra note 39, at 294 (“[E]ven if a
candidate decides not to engage in similar tactics, except to ‘correct’ a misimpression created by an
opponent, the result may be only to distract the voters from substantive issues.”).
44. See Eric Boehlert, The Media’s Final Email Flop, A Fitting End to Journalism’s Troubled
Campaign Season, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Nov. 7, 2016, 11:59 AM), http://mediamatters.org/blog/2016/11/07/media-s-final-email-flop-fitting-end-journalism-s-troubled-campaignseason/214357.
45. See Ashdown, supra note 42, at 1092 (“If [voters] are told lies about issues and candidates,
these decisions [about what is best for them and the country] get skewed.”).
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may become so cynical and distrustful toward the electoral process46 that they
essentially tune out campaign speech regardless of its value.47 In many instances, they may become so discouraged that they refuse to vote.48 Such
alienation may also dampen broader behaviors thought essential to self-government, from participation in local government to keeping informed on important public issues.49 Of particular concern is the immeasurable but corrosive effect that an atmosphere of noxious political discourse may have on the
caliber of public officials. Awareness that their character and positions may
be subjected to harsh distortion has doubtless deterred many highly qualified
individuals from assuming the already daunting burdens of pursuing office.50
Given these costs, it is not surprising that some observers have endorsed
restrictions on false political campaign speech.51 Indeed, one commentator
has advocated that these laws sanction materially false campaign advertising
that is made with negligence52 rather than actual malice as typically found in

46. See Michael Kimmel, A Proposal to Strengthen the Right of Response to Negative Campaign Commercials, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 89, 90 (1999).
47. See Goldman, supra note 37, at 896 (“In a USA TODAY/Gallup Poll, seven out of ten
persons ‘said they believed “not much” or “nothing at all” of what they heard in political ads.’”
(quoting Susan Page, Nasty Ads Close Out a Mud-Caked Campaign, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 2006, at
11A)).
48. See id.; Hannah Griffin, Keep It Clean? How Negative Campaigns Affect Voter Turnout,
17 RES PUBLICA—J. UNDERGRADUATE RES., no. 1, 2012, at 1, https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica/vol17/iss1/6/.
49. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, For ‘Millennials,’ a Tide of Cynicism and a Partisan Gap, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/us/politics/for-millennial-voters-atide-of-cynicism-toward-politics.html; see also Ashdown, supra note 42, at 1094 (“If the heart of
free speech is to foster participation in the making of policy choices in a self-governing system, then
something is terribly misguided when the process actually discourages such involvement and engagement.” (footnote omitted)).
50. See Goldman, supra note 37, at 896 (“The level of discourse and disrespect for politicians
also discourages qualified candidates from seeking office.”).
51. E.g., id. at 914–15; Marshall, supra note 39, at 294; Michelle Roberts, Ask Me No Questions and I’ll Tell You No Lies: The First Amendment and Falsehoods in Ballot Question Campaigns, 33 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37, 40 (2013); Williams, supra note 35, at 341 (“Accurate information about legislation and candidates is essential for intelligent, rational lawmaking and voting.”).
It is worth noting that Professor Marshall’s argument, while elegant and thorough, rests heavily on
an extrapolation of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), upholding a federal law restricting corporate political campaign expenditures. See Marshall, supra
note 39, at 300–22. Whatever force this logic may have is severely undercut by the Court’s overturning this ruling in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010) (overruling portion of
McConnell upholding restrictions on corporate independent expenditures).
52. Goldman, supra note 37, at 914–15.
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state statutes.53 The existence of such laws signals sympathy with the position of these scholars; a recent canvass determined that at least eighteen states
penalize false political speech.54
Nor is this view without some foundation in opinions by the Court. In
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,55 the Court declared that “[a] State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the
integrity of its election process.”56 More to the point, the Court, in weighing
a regulation of campaign literature in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,57 recognized that “false statements [in election materials], if credited,
may have serious adverse consequences for the public at large.”58 In even
stronger terms, the Court in Brown v. Hartlage59 recognized “the state interest
in protecting the political process from distortions caused by untrue and inaccurate speech.”60 Such pronouncements might be viewed as signaling ample latitude by states to sanction candidates’ false speech. At the same time,
however, the Court in each case ultimately struck down the campaign regulation at issue.61 This disjunction intimates the broader criticism of bans on
false campaign speech discussed below.
2. Infringement of Core First Amendment Values
The fundamental objection to prohibition of false campaign speech is
obvious and powerful: It constitutes a content-based restriction on expression
at the apex of First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court’s rulings
have consistently reflected Alexander Meiklejohn’s thesis that unhindered
political speech is essential to self-government and therefore lies at the heart
of the First Amendment.62 Thus, the Court has time and again acknowledged

53. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-13-109 (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.271
(West 2015).
54. Margaret H. Zhang, Note, Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus and the (Bleak) Future of
Statutes That Ban False Statements in Political Campaigns, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 20 &
n.8 (2015).
55. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
56. Id. at 231 (citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973)).
57. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
58. Id. at 349.
59. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
60. Id. at 61.
61. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 349–51 (striking down ban on disseminating anonymous campaign
literature); Eu, 489 U.S. at 222–29 (invalidating ban on endorsements of candidates in primary contests by state political parties); Brown, 456 U.S. at 61–62 (overturning enforcement of ban on candidates’ factual misstatements where candidate’s statement was made in good faith and swiftly disavowed upon realization of his error).
62. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 65–66, 69–70 (1948); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 75 (1960) (The main purpose of the First Amendment
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the privileged place of political expression in the hierarchy of First Amendment freedoms,63 and has particularly emphasized the crucial place of speech
about political candidates.64 Accordingly, the Court has subjected restrictions on political expression to “exacting scrutiny.”65
It is therefore unsurprising that the Court has struck down, for example,
a ban on all anonymous political leafletting,66 criminal penalties for publishing editorials on election day urging people to vote a certain way on issues
on the ballot,67 a prohibition against state party central committees’ endorsing
candidates in primary elections,68 a requirement that circulators of petitions

“is to give every voting member of the body politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of those problems with which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal.”); see also
OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 2–3 (1996) (Under a democratic theory of free speech,
the law is intended “as a protection of popular sovereignty . . . to broaden the terms of public discussion as a way of enabling common citizens to become aware of the issues before them and of
the arguments on all sides and thus to pursue their ends fully and freely.”).
63. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010) (“[P]olitical speech . . . is central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”); Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (“[Political speech] is ‘at the core of our First Amendment freedoms.’”
(quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861, 863 (8th Cir. 2001))); Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“[S]peech on public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values,’ and is entitled to special protection.” (first quoting NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); then quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
467 (1980)); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) (“The public interest in having
free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance [is] the core value of the Free Speech
Clause . . . .”); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs.”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”).
64. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339–40 (“The First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most
urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” (quoting Eu, 489 U.S.
at 223)). Accord McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347; Brown, 456 U.S. at 53; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
15 (1976) (per curiam); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (“[D]ebate on the qualifications of candidates [is] integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution.”).
65. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45). Accord Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 327 (Courts “must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling
[political] speech.” (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (plurality
opinion))); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 346 (reiterating that “[t]he First Amendment affords the broadest
protection” to “[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates” (quoting
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (A state must show that “a facially content-based restriction on political speech
in a public forum” is “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end.” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983))); Brown, 456 U.S. at 53–54 (“When a State seeks to restrict directly the offer of ideas by a
candidate to the voters, the First Amendment surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably
supported by not only a legitimate state interest, but a compelling one, and that the restriction operate without unnecessarily circumscribing protected expression.”).
66. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347.
67. Mills, 384 U.S. at 219.
68. Eu, 489 U.S. at 224.
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supporting proposed state initiatives be registered voters,69 and a verdict
against a political candidate who falsely insinuated criminal conduct by his
deputy sheriff opponent without verifying or investigating third-party assertions.70 Only in rare instances, where a restriction clearly is narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling interest and trenches on a modest amount of speech,
does it survive the Court’s rigorous scrutiny.71
Nor are proscriptions of false campaign speech exempt from this stringent review. Indeed, Charles Fried has asserted, “[i]n political campaigns the
grossest misstatements, deceptions, and defamations are immune from legal
sanction unless they violate private rights—that is, unless individuals are defamed.”72 Admittedly, the Supreme Court has not expressly affirmed this
breadth of impunity. Nevertheless, support for it can be found in the Court’s
jurisprudence. A leading—if limited—holding on this question came in
Brown v. Hartlage.73 There, the Court held that a candidate’s presumably
false campaign promise did not fall outside the purview of First Amendment
protection.74 As a candidate for county commissioner, Brown had pledged to
lower his salary if elected.75 Upon learning that his promise arguably violated
a state anti-corruption statute, Brown retracted his statement.76 When Brown
won the election, his opponent brought suit to have the election voided on the
ground of Brown’s alleged violation of the statute.77 After rejecting two possible justifications for applying the statute to Brown,78 the Court focused on
the state’s power to sanction factual misstatements. The opinion repeatedly
emphasized the “special vitality” of free speech during election campaigns,79
noting the First Amendment’s promotion of an “atmosphere of free discussion” in political campaigns80 and the “special force” with which the preference for counterspeech over censorship applies in this context.81 In particular, the Court found the statute’s provision for automatic voidability of

69. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 192 (1999).
70. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732–33 (1968).
71. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 205–06 (1992) (upholding ban on solicitation
of votes and display of campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling place on day of election).
72. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 225, 238 (1992).
73. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
74. Id. at 62.
75. Id. at 48.
76. Id. at 48–49.
77. Id. at 49.
78. Id. at 54–59 (rejecting application of the statute as method of preventing vote buying); id.
at 59–60 (rejecting application of the statute as means to curb election of independently wealthy but
less qualified candidates).
79. Id. at 53.
80. Id. at 61.
81. Id.
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elections won by violators—irrespective of intent—“inconsistent” with the
First Amendment’s extreme solicitude for campaign expression.82 Candidates’ awareness that their misstatements would be subject to this strict liability would produce an intolerable “chilling effect” on their speech.83 Instead, latitude for error must be supplied to allow free debate the “breathing
space” that it needs to flourish.84
While Brown thus offers a strong measure of protection for false campaign speech, the precise scope of its legacy is ambiguous. The Court highlighted the absence of evidence that Brown had made the statement at issue
“other than in good faith and without knowledge of its falsity, or that he made
the statement with reckless disregard as to whether it was false or not,”85
thereby substantially importing the actual malice standard for public official
defamation plaintiffs into this setting.86 Accordingly, the opinion might be
viewed as condoning nullification of elections where the victor is shown to
have spoken with actual malice. Still, the Court in Brown was not called on
to decide whether even the actual malice standard would furnish adequate
protection for false campaign speech. Moreover, the Court’s tribute to the
special value of counterspeech in political campaigns,87 accompanied by its
observation that “a candidate’s factual blunder is unlikely to escape the notice
of, and correction by, the erring candidate’s political opponent,”88 offers grist
for the conclusion that nondefamatory false campaign statements lie beyond
the reach of state regulation altogether.
This Article argues below89 that the Court’s decision in United States v.
Alvarez90 effectively resolved lingering questions about political candidates’
right to utter falsehoods in favor of the more expansive view. It is first instructive, however, to review the extent to which lower courts were invalidating bans on false campaign speech even prior to Alvarez. As long ago as
1975, a federal district court panel struck down New York’s prohibition on
the “misrepresentation of any candidate’s qualifications[,] . . . position[,] . . .
party affiliation[,] or party endorsement” “during the course of any campaign
for nomination or election to public office.”91
82. Id. at 61–62.
83. Id. at 61.
84. Id. at 60–61 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964)).
85. Id. at 61.
86. Cf. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. The Court was also troubled that Brown’s offense was
not mitigated by his having swiftly disavowed his statement upon learning of his apparent error.
See Brown, 456 U.S. at 61–62.
87. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
88. Brown, 465 U.S. at 61.
89. See infra Part I.B.
90. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
91. Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 6201.1 (1974)), aff’d sub nom. Schwartz v. Postel, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976).
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Faulting the statute’s lack of an actual malice requirement,92 the panel
declared the statute overbroad.93 Twenty years later, the Washington Supreme Court in Rickert v. Public Disclosure Commission94 addressed a law
forbidding persons “to sponsor with actual malice . . . [p]olitical advertising
or an electioneering communication that contains a false statement of material fact about a candidate for public office.”95 The court had earlier overturned a far broader predecessor of the statute96 because it “presupposes the
State possesses an independent right to determine truth and falsity in political
debate.”97 In response, the Washington legislature confined the statute’s
reach to statements made about the candidates98 other than by the candidates
themselves.99
Nevertheless, the court held that this much-trimmed version of the statute also rested on the fatally flawed premise that “the government, rather than
the people, may be the final arbiter of truth.”100 The court pointed out the
chilling effect that the mere specter of a potentially politicized enforcement
process might exert on campaign speech.101 Moreover, even accepting—as
the Rickert court did not102—that the statute served a compelling state interest, the exemption for false statements made about a candidate by herself or
her supporters rendered the law underinclusive.103 The court thus concluded
that in this area as in others, “the best remedy for false or unpleasant speech
is more speech, not less speech.”104 A few years later, on the eve of Alvarez,
the Eighth Circuit similarly determined that a Minnesota ban on false advertising or campaign material about ballot initiatives would violate the First
Amendment unless it could survive strict scrutiny.105
The Sixth Circuit in Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commission106 did uphold a provision of a statute that prohibited false campaign speech, but
viewed in perspective, the decision offered little encouragement to efforts to
92. Id. at 92.
93. Id. at 97.
94. 168 P.3d 826 (Wash. 2007).
95. Id. at 828 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.530(1)(a) (2007)).
96. The previous law had barred “[p]olitical advertising that contains a false statement of material fact.” State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 694
(Wash. 1998) (en banc) (quoting WASH REV. CODE § 42.17.530(1)(a) (1998)).
97. Id. at 695.
98. Rickert, 168 P.3d at 827.
99. Id. at 828.
100. Id. at 827.
101. See id. at 832.
102. Id. at 830–31.
103. Id. at 831.
104. Id. at 832.
105. 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 633–36 (8th Cir. 2011).
106. 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991).
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suppress such expression.107 Though striking down provisions authorizing
the Ohio Elections Commission to impose fines and cease-and-desist orders,108 the court permitted the commission to reprimand violators. This official chastisement represented a modest concession to state power compared
to the more concrete provisions invalidated. Indeed, it did not rely on a peculiar power to regulate false expression at all. In sustaining the reprimand
as an exercise in “truth-declaring,”109 the court appeared to recognize this
function as an instance of government speech exempt from the limitations of
the First Amendment.110
B. Alvarez and the Elevation of Falsehood’s Constitutional Status
Prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Alvarez, even successful challenges to bans on false campaign speech were inhibited by the premise that
factually false expression is not entitled to First Amendment protection.111
Numerous assertions by the Court, at least when considered in isolation, had
supported this proposition.112 In Alvarez, however, the Court ruled that even
intentionally false statements—lies—do not categorically fall outside the ambit of free speech.113
1. Alvarez’s Two Routes to Invalidation
The Court in Alvarez struck down the Stolen Valor Act114 (“SVA”) in a
case involving a legally and morally egregious violation of the law.115 Concerned that the existing ban on falsely purporting to have earned a military
107. Id. at 575.
108. The court held that while the statute was constitutional on its face because false speech is
not protected, the procedures used for its enforcement were flawed. Id. at 578. In a case decided
after Alvarez, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s ruling that false speech does
not lie beyond the pale of First Amendment protection had abrogated Pestrak’s holding that Ohio’s
political false-statements laws were facially constitutional. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814
F.3d 466, 471–72 (6th Cir. 2016).
109. Pestrak, 926 F.2d at 579.
110. See Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015)
(“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content
of what it says.” (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009))).
111. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing rationales).
112. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984) (“There is ‘no constitutional value in false statements of fact.’” (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
340 (1974))); Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (“[F]alse statements
are not immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech . . . .”); Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979) (“Spreading false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment
credentials.”); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (“[T]he erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection . . . .”).
113. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 729–30 (2012) (plurality opinion).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
115. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 729–30.
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medal had proved ineffective,116 Congress attached legal penalties to this
behavior in the Act.117 Xavier Alvarez was prosecuted under the SVA for
introducing himself as a member of a district water board in this manner:
“I’m a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I
was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. I got wounded many times
by the same guy.”118 In fact, the entire narrative represented “a series of bizarre lies.”119
At the outset, Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion120 virtually determined the outcome by reciting the principle that content-based speech restrictions like the SVA were subject to “exacting scrutiny.”121 Under this
stringent—if imprecise122—level of review, even a law serving the Act’s
weighty purposes123 would be “presumed invalid.”124 Nor did the fact that
the statute took aim at factual falsehoods salvage its validity. Justice Kennedy did acknowledge previous Court pronouncements affirming that the falsity of speech at issue had contributed to its susceptibility to restriction.125
He was unwilling, however, to extrapolate from these specific instances of
proscribability a hard rule that false statements receive no First Amendment
protection.126 On the contrary, even when considering certain types of unprotected speech, like defamation and fraud, the Court had been “careful to
instruct that falsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First
Amendment.”127 Thus, three examples of falsehood cited by the govern-

116. Brief for Petitioner at 6, United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (No. 11-210).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2012) (“Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in
writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed
Forces of the United States, any of the service medals or badges awarded to the members of such
forces, the ribbon, button, or rosette of any such badge, decoration, or medal, or any colorable imitation of such item shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or both.”).
118. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 713–14.
119. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
120. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 713.
121. Id. at 715.
122. See Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of Free Speech
Doctrine and Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV.
499, 512–13 (2013) (describing “exacting scrutiny” as “a not very clearly defined level of scrutiny”). But see Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Voracious First Amendment: Alvarez
and Knox in the Context of 2012 and Beyond, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 491, 496 (2013) (describing
plurality opinion as “[a]pplying strict scrutiny” to SVA).
123. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724.
124. Id. at 717 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004)).
125. Id. at 718–19.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 719; see also id. at 720 (“[The federal] prohibition on false statements made to Government officials . . . does not lead to the broader proposition that false statements are unprotected
when made to any person, at any time, in any context.”).
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ment—making false statements to a public official, perjury, and misrepresenting oneself as an officer of the government—caused serious disruption
of governmental functions rather than being punishable solely for their falsity.128
Accordingly, these and other restrictions on falsity approved by the
Court did “not establish a principle that all proscriptions of false statements
are exempt from exacting First Amendment scrutiny.”129 On the contrary,
the plurality squarely rejected the idea that false expression “should be in a
general category that is presumptively unprotected.”130 Acceptance of such
a principle would amount to recognition of a new category of unprotected
speech131 in deviation from the historical touchstone established for this
highly limited list. Under this approach, permissible content-based restrictions have generally been confined to a “few ‘historic and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to the bar.’”132 False statements per se
had no such pedigree.133
Rather, only when falsity caused a “legally cognizable harm” was it subject to government proscription.134 Justice Kennedy pointed to defamation
and fraud as notable examples where this criterion was met.135 By contrast,
the SVA “targets falsity and nothing more.”136 Specifically, the opinion emphasized that the Act’s prohibition was not confined to instances where misrepresentation of military honors secured “valuable considerations”137 or
other “material advantage[s].”138 Justice Kennedy did acknowledge the government’s valid interest in guarding the integrity of the military honors system, which “serve[s] the important public function of recognizing and expressing gratitude for acts of heroism and sacrifice in military service,” and
‘“foste[rs] morale, mission accomplishment and esprit de corps’ among service members.”139 The SVA’s blunt ban on all false indications of having
earned a military medal did not meet the “exacting” scrutiny to which it was
subject.
128. Id. at 720–21.
129. Id. at 720.
130. Id. at 722.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 717 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468
(2010)).
133. See id. at 722.
134. Id. at 719.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 723.
138. Id.; see id. at 714 (“[Alvarez’s false] statements do not seem to have been made to secure
employment or financial benefits or admission to privileges reserved for those who had earned the
Medal.”).
139. Id. at 724 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra note 116, at 37, 38).
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Under this level of review, the Act’s prohibition foundered on two obstacles. First, the government failed to meet its “heavy burden” of demonstrating that false claims had diluted the public’s perception of actual award
recipients.140 On the contrary, Justice Kennedy endorsed the assertion of the
Veterans of Foreign Wars that “there is nothing that charlatans such as Xavier
Alvarez can do to stain [the Medal recipients’] honor.”141 Moreover, even
assuming that false claims had undermined the military honors system, the
SVA’s sweeping restrictions on speech were not narrowly tailored to avert
this harm. Indeed, the government had not shown that suppressing speech
was needed at all to preserve the luster of military medals.142 Invoking famous maxims by Justices Brandeis and Holmes, the plurality pointed to counterspeech as the preferred remedy to false expression under the First Amendment.143 Alvarez’s own lie offered a powerful illustration of the efficacy of
this response. Once the lie became known, the episode was reported by the
media and Alvarez was ridiculed online.144 Moreover, a more comprehensive
form of counterspeech was also available. A government-created database
listing Congressional Medal of Honor winners that is accessible to the public
would presumably vindicate the government’s interest in preserving the integrity of the military awards system.145 Thus, in the words of two commentators, the government had “less restrictive means than criminally prosecuting liars” to achieve its goal.146
Finally, transcending the details of the plurality’s analysis was concern
with the ominous implications of government carte blanche to ban any species of falsity. Such authority would empower government to forbid false
speech on a wide range of subjects and in whatever form the expression
took—“whether shouted from the rooftops or made in a barely audible whisper.”147 Nor did Justice Kennedy mince words about the totalitarian potential
140. Id. at 726.
141. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (No. 11-210)).
142. Id. at 726–27.
143. Id. at 727–28 (“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. . . . (‘If there be
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence’). The theory of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’” (citation omitted) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring), and then quoting and citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting))); see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 795
(2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If [a state] believes that certain sorts of candidate speech disclose
flaws in the candidate’s credentials, democracy and free speech [rather than restrictions] are their
own correctives.”).
144. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 727.
145. Id. at 729.
146. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 122, at 496–97.
147. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723.
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of permitting government this “broad censorial power.”148 He repudiated this
power for its lack of a “clear limiting principle” and its resemblance to the
dystopian system portrayed in George Orwell’s classic novel, Nineteen
Eighty-Four.149 However “contemptible” Alvarez’s lies, the First Amendment was designed to avoid the path to such a society; one of the provision’s
costs is that “it protects the speech we detest as well as the speech we embrace.”150
While Justice Breyer concurred only in the judgment,151 he was in broad
agreement with the plurality on several points. Like the plurality, he refused
to interpret the Court’s past statements about falsity’s unworthiness of protection as “mean[ing] ‘no protection at all.’”152 After all, false statements can
serve constructive purposes not only in social contexts,153 but also “in public[,] . . . technical, philosophical, and scientific” settings.154 In addition, Justice Breyer shared the plurality’s anxiety over the capacity for abuse inherent
in empowering government to punish expression for its sheer falsity. In particular, he raised the prospect of government’s selectively pursuing false
claims by disfavored groups while leaving similar claims by members with
sympathetic views unmolested.155 Justice Breyer further echoed the plurality’s caution that the very existence of this kind of power could chill deserving expression.156
Nevertheless, Justice Breyer would not sign onto the plurality’s “strict
categorical analysis.”157 Instead, he favored what he variously characterized
as “intermediate scrutiny,” “‘proportionality’ review,” and “an examination
of ‘fit.’”158 Under this approach, the Court assesses whether the law in ques-

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 729–30.
151. Id. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer’s opinion was joined by Justice Kagan.
Id.
152. Id. at 733.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 734.
156. Compare id. at 723 (plurality opinion) (“The mere potential for the exercise of that power
casts . . . a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free speech, thought, and discourse are to
remain a foundation of our freedom.”), with id. at 733 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he threat of
criminal prosecution for making a false statement can inhibit the speaker from making true statements, thereby ‘chilling’ a kind of speech that lies at the First Amendment’s heart.”).
157. Id. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring).
158. Id. Justice Breyer’s adoption of this standard has evoked skepticism from scholars. See,
e.g., Benjamin Pomerance, An Elastic Amendment: Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s Fluid Conceptions
of Freedom of Speech, 79 ALB. L. REV. 403, 492 (2016) (observing that Justice Breyer “[s]pen[t]
very little time discussing the Court’s prior history of applying strict scrutiny to content-based
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tion “works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justifications.”159 The crucial consideration is whether the government could achieve
its objective “in less burdensome ways”; here, Justice Breyer thought, it
could.160 As Justice Alito pointed out in dissent, however, Justice Breyer’s
sketch of this standard supplied slim guidance to legislators seeking to craft
a permissible law advancing the SVA’s aims.161 Also left unsettled was
whether future prohibitions of false expression would be governed by the
concurrence’s intermediate scrutiny162 or the plurality’s more demanding
test.163
2. Alvarez’s Impact
At least with respect to false campaign expression, the precise level of
scrutiny to be gleaned from Alvarez may make little practical difference.
General prohibitions of false political campaign speech164 have fared poorly
in the wake of Alvarez. Although these rulings have reserved the theoretical
possibility of valid legislation in this area, it seems unlikely that meaningful
laws of this sort could actually be crafted.

laws”); Smolla, supra note 122, at 508 (asserting that Justice Breyer elected to apply intermediate
scrutiny “without much real analysis or explication”).
159. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 730.
160. Id. at 737.
161. See id. at 744–45 (Alito, J., dissenting). This vagueness was not Justice Alito’s principal
critique of the decision. Citing the Court’s past declarations that false statements of fact do not
warrant constitutional protection, id. at 746–48, Justice Alito argued that the lies covered by the
SVA could be banned because they had no value. Id. at 749–50. Conversely, these lies harmed
both the nation’s “system of military honors” and “medal recipients and their families.” Id. at 739.
Analogizing to trademark law, Justice Alito reasoned that “the proliferation of false claims about
military awards blurs the signal given out by the actual awards by making them seem more common
than they really are, and this diluting effect harms the military by hampering its efforts to foster
morale and esprit de corps.” Id. at 743–44. Thus, Alvarez could be punished for his “misappropriation” of the Medal of Honor. Id. at 754.
162. See People v. Morera-Munoz, 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 409, 419–20 (Ct. App. 2016).
163. See O’Neill v. Crawford, 132 Ohio St. 3d 1472 (Ohio 2012) (decision referenced in the
North Eastern Reporter, 970 N.E.2d 973).
164. Laws targeted at specific campaign abuses causing demonstrable harms could present a
different case. Compare Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 74 MONT. L. REV. 53, 75 (2013) (arguing that after Alvarez, “interests supporting false campaign speech laws . . . [are] unlikely to trump the courts’ concerns about censorship and partisan
manipulation of these processes in speech at the core of the First Amendment”), and Staci Lieffring,
Note, First Amendment and the Right to Lie: Regulating Knowingly False Campaign Speech After
United States v. Alvarez, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1061 (2013) (arguing that after Alvarez, “[i]t
seems likely that the Court would strike down any attempt to regulate false, non-defamatory campaign speech”), with Hasen, supra, at 57, 69–77 (asserting that Alvarez permits bans on false election speech about the “mechanics of voting” such as when to vote where defendant is shown by
clear and convincing evidence to have acted with actual malice), and Lieffring, supra, at 1078
(“Laws aimed at preventing false information about voter eligibility, polling places or election dates
and times . . . would be deemed constitutional.”).
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As noted earlier, Alvarez added potency to the hostility toward bans on
false political165 campaign speech displayed by lower courts even before the
Court’s decision.166 In Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,167 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit struck down an Ohio law barring
persons from disseminating false information about a political candidate
“knowing the same to be false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not, if the statement is designed to promote the election, nomination,
or defeat of the candidate.”168 The court’s analysis began by acknowledging
that Alvarez had abrogated the court’s earlier holding in Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commission.169 It ended by noting that other courts encountering similar laws since Alvarez had likewise found them invalid.170 With Alvarez
having erased the fallacy that false speech is invisible to the First Amendment, the principle that restrictions on political speech are subject to strict
scrutiny applied.171 Here, the state had failed to demonstrate that its ban was
narrowly tailored to protect its concededly compelling interest in protecting
the integrity of its elections.172 Rather the law forbade far too much speech
and reached too many speakers, left untouched considerable damage to the
interest it sought to serve, and was enforced by machinery fraught with potential for obstruction and mischief.173
In 281 Care Committee v. Arneson,174 the Eighth Circuit similarly rejected a Minnesota law that barred persons from
participat[ing] in the preparation, dissemination, or broadcast of
paid political advertising or campaign material . . . with respect to
the effect of a ballot question, that is designed or tends to . . . promote or defeat a ballot question, that is false, and that the person
knows is false or communicates to others with reckless disregard
of whether it is false.175

165. Restrictions on judicial campaign speech are discussed infra Part II.
166. See supra notes 89–110 and accompanying text.
167. 814 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2016).
168. Id. at 469–70 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE § 3517.21(B)(10)).
169. See id. at 471–72 (citing Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991)).
Pestrak is discussed supra, at notes 106–110 and accompanying text. The district court had made
Alvarez the centerpiece of its analysis in its own invalidation of Ohio’s statute. See List v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 45 F. Supp. 3d 765, 778 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (“The response to the unreasoned is
the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth.” (quoting
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012), (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted)), aff’d
sub nom. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466.
170. Driehaus, 814 F.3d at 476.
171. Id. at 473.
172. Id. at 473–74.
173. Id. at 474–75.
174. 766 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2014).
175. Id. at 778 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 211B.06(1)).
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More explicitly than in Driehaus, the Eighth Circuit characterized Alvarez as a doctrinal requisite for strict scrutiny rather than its source. The court
noted that, while Alvarez “guides our analysis,” it was the Supreme Court’s
proclamations on the protection of political speech that determined the level
of scrutiny in this instance.176 Even if Justice Breyer’s application of intermediate scrutiny to the SVA was controlling in Alvarez, the court reasoned,
Justice Breyer himself had indicated that a ban on false political speech
would call for more stringent review.177 At any rate, Minnesota’s ban could
not survive this harsh glare, for the statute was not narrowly tailored to attain
the state’s (presumed) compelling “interest in preserving ‘fair and honest’
elections and preventing a ‘fraud upon the electorate.’”178 Rather, the law
suffered from multiple flaws. It was not necessary to the state’s achievement
of its purpose,179 it was both overbroad180 and underinclusive,181 the law’s
potential for abuse could deter protected speech,182 and a means less restrictive of speech—viz., counterspeech—was available to accomplish its
goals.183 In other instances as well, courts since Alvarez have ruled bans on
false campaign speech insufficiently tailored to their aim of protecting the
integrity of elections.184
3. Alvarez in Context
Decisions like Driehaus and 281 Care Committee can be viewed as reflecting more than special solicitude for political speech; they are also consistent with a broader hostility toward content-based restrictions displayed by
the Supreme Court throughout this decade. This attitude has been especially
evident in the Court’s protection of speech widely considered to be of little
or no value and repugnant to many.185 In United States v. Stevens,186 the

176. Id. at 784.
177. See id. at 783–84.
178. Id. at 787.
179. Id. at 788–91.
180. Id. at 791–92.
181. Id. at 794–95.
182. Id. at 794.
183. Id. at 793–94.
184. See, e.g., Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354, 361–62 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Alvarez to
support conclusion that counterspeech is prescribed remedy for misleading speech); Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1251–57 (Mass. 2015) (applying strict scrutiny under Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to invalidate state statute criminalizing certain false statements about
political candidates and questions submitted to voters); Magda v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 58
N.E.3d 1188, 1205 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
185. See generally John D. Moore, The Closed and Shrinking Frontier of Unprotected Speech,
36 WHITTIER L. REV. 1 (2014) (charting the erosion of categorically unprotected speech).
186. 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
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Court set the tone for a newly vigorous enforcement of its longstanding187
suspicion of restrictions aimed at particular content. There, the Court overturned a conviction for selling videos of dogfighting under a federal ban on
depictions of animal cruelty that the Court held facially invalid.188 The Court
rejected in strong terms the government’s contention that this category of
expression should be added to the roster of unprotected speech because its
costs outweigh its value.189 For the Court, this approach amounted to “a freefloating test for First Amendment coverage” that was “startling and dangerous.”190
In the term between Stevens and Alvarez, the Court reaffirmed that unpopularity, presumably meager worth, and even putative harm would not
overcome the First Amendment’s aversion to restrictions aimed at specified
content. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,191 the Court
struck down a California statute barring the sale or rental of “violent video
games” to minors and requiring their packaging to be labeled “18.”192 The
result was essentially preordained when Justice Scalia declared that the case
would be governed by Stevens’s resistance to recognizing new categories of
unprotected speech absent a compelling showing of historical sanction.193
California contended that engagement with violent video games promoted
aggression in juveniles in a way that exposure to traditional media did not,
because the player “participates in the violent action on screen and determines its outcome.”194 Much like the plurality in Alvarez a year later, however, the Court found the government’s evidence of a causal link between the
forbidden speech and alleged harm inadequate to survive the strict scrutiny
that prohibition of content required.195
The holding in Brown was in the spirit of—though not expressly reliant
on—the Court’s decision a few months earlier in Snyder v. Phelps.196 There,
the defendants had been held liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress for picketing the funeral of a soldier killed in the line of duty; their signs
had asserted that deaths of American soldiers and other calamities reflected
187. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations
are presumptively invalid.” (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991))); Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”).
188. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 464–67, 482.
189. Id. at 469–70.
190. Id. at 470.
191. 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
192. Id. at 789, 802–05.
193. See id. at 791–93.
194. Id. at 798.
195. See id. at 799–801.
196. 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
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God’s wrath for the nation’s tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in the
military.197 By almost any ordinary reckoning, the sentiments expressed
would be considered offensive if not odious,198 and the Court intimated a low
regard for the pickets’ value.199 Nevertheless, the Court vacated the damages
award, finding that the distress complained of “turned on the content and
viewpoint of the message conveyed.”200 Under the First Amendment’s mandate “to protect even hurtful speech on public issues,” the defendants could
not be punished for the pain their speech inflicted on the decedent’s family.201
More recently, the Court placed content-based restrictions in even further peril in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.202 In Reed, the Court struck down Gilbert’s sign code as a content-based regulation of speech.203 The code had
imposed disparate restrictions on size, location, and times of display for three
relevant categories of signs.204 Most striking about the decision was not its
outcome,205 but rather the Court’s description of content-based speech regulation as “a law applie[d] to particular speech because of the topic discussed
or the idea or message expressed.”206 On its face, this criterion appears to
collapse the distinction between content regulation and subject-matter regulation.207 Even if Reed did not have that drastic of an impact,208 however, the
Court unequivocally reaffirmed that restrictions deemed content-based
would draw strict scrutiny.209 There can be little doubt that bans on false
campaign speech fall into this category.

197. Id. at 448–51.
198. See id. at 448 (noting that signs stated, inter alia, “Thank God for 9/11,” “Thank God for
Dead Soldiers,” and “God Hates Fags”).
199. See id. at 460 (“[The defendants’] funeral picketing is certainly hurtful and its contribution
to public discourse may be negligible.”); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 714 (2012)
(plurality opinion) (describing protests in Snyder as “hateful”).
200. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 457, 459.
201. Id. at 460–61.
202. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
203. Id. at 2224.
204. Id. at 2224–25 (describing requirements for “Ideological Sign[s],” “Political Sign[s],” and
“Temporary Directional Signs” (alterations in original)).
205. The Court voted unanimously to invalidate the code. Id. at 2223. Three Justices—Kennedy, Alito, and Sotomayor—signed onto an opinion concurring with Justice Thomas’s majority
opinion, while three others—Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan—concurred only in the judgment. Id.
206. Id. at 2227.
207. See Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that “Reed
effectively abolishes any distinction between content regulation and subject-matter regulation”);
Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399, 405 (4th Cir. 2015); Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech Response
to the Gay Rights/Religious Liberty Conflict, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1125, 1133–34 (2016).
208. Note, Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1981, 2000
(2016) (“To the extent that lower court reception of Reed is beginning to define a doctrinal equilibrium, Reed’s impact has been narrow.”).
209. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231; see also id. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring).
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II. THE IMPACT OF REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE ON
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN RESTRICTIONS
The broad immunity extended to false political campaign speech did not
automatically translate to comparable protection for false judicial campaign
expression. Indeed, decades of restrictions on judicial candidates’ ability to
make a range of statements assumed decisive differences between political
and judicial campaign speech under the First Amendment. In 2002, however,
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White210 upended this premise by subjecting the restriction at issue there to strict scrutiny.211 Since then, lower courts have invoked White to invalidate restraints
on judicial candidates’ speech besides the one struck down in that case.212
A. Judicial Campaign Speech Codes: The Attempted Separation of
Elections and Politics
An overwhelming majority of the nation’s state judges must run the
gauntlet of popular election. Citizens’ votes determine the selection or retention of judges in thirty-nine states.213 According to a frequently cited tally,
about eighty-seven percent of state judges stand for election at least once to
attain or hold their office.214 These figures contrast starkly with the appointment215 and lifetime tenure216 of federal judges. Through these arrangements,
the Framers sought to preserve judicial independence in the face of majoritarian pressures.217 Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, however, the

210.
211.
212.
213.

536 U.S. 765 (2002). The case is discussed infra Part II.B.
Id. at 774, 781.
See infra Part II.C.
See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND
GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2013), http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Judicial_Selection_Charts_1196376173077.pdf.
214. Robert C. Berness, Note, Norms of Judicial Behavior: Understanding Restrictions on Judicial Candidate Speech in the Age of Attack Politics, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2001); see
also Rachel Caufield, Judicial Elections: Today’s Trends and Tomorrow’s Forecast, 46 JUDGES’ J.
6, 6 (2007) (“Among state trial courts, 76 percent of judges are elected to their initial term, and 88
percent face the voters for subsequent terms on the bench. For state appellate courts, 53 percent of
judges are elected to their initial term on the bench, and 89 percent face the voters for subsequent
terms on the bench.”).
215. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing for appointment by the President with advice and
consent of the Senate).
216. Id. art. III, § 1 (providing that judges shall hold office “during good Behaviour”).
217. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); see also Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First
Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 306 (2003) (“The protection
of judicial independence is . . . perhaps the foundational principle . . . of Article III.” (emphasis
omitted)).
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appeal of democratic accountability influenced the widespread adoption of
direct election of state judges.218
In time, sentiment arose that allowing judicial candidates to conduct
their campaigns in the same manner as their political counterparts posed dangers to the distinctive function and character of the judiciary.219 Campaign
expression and activity deemed appropriate for aspirants to a legislative or
elective office could undermine judicial candidates’ capacity to act as fair
and impartial arbiters of the law once in office.220 For example, commitments
to adhere to specific positions are the lifeblood of traditional political campaigning. For judicial candidates, however, such commitments are said to
undermine the impartial consideration of evidence and arguments expected
of judges.221 Regardless of their actual effect on judges’ behavior, moreover,
these commitments are viewed as impairing public respect for the judiciary
by fostering the perception of judicial candidates as mere politicians.222
These kinds of concerns came to be embodied in limitations on the
speech and political activities of judicial candidates. A milestone was the
provision of the 1972 American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Code of
Judicial Conduct223 stating that a candidate for judicial office “should not
make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and
218. See EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 80–135 (1944).
219. See Gerald Stern, The Changing Face of Judicial Elections, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1507,
1509 (2004) (“The argument in support of the restrictions [on judicial campaign speech] is that,
unlike other public officials, judges play a unique role in deciding issues of fact and law, based on
principles of established law. They are not the public’s representatives in the political sense.”).
220. Shira J. Goodman et al., What’s More Important: Electing Judges or Judicial Independence? It’s Time for Pennsylvania to Choose Judicial Independence, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 859, 862
(2010); see Ofer Raban, Judicial Impartiality and the Regulation of Judicial Election Campaigns,
15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 214 (2004) (“Opinions which electioneering legislators are free
to express and then to try to act upon may be totally out of bounds for elected judges and a threat to
their duties of office.”).
221. See Stephen Gillers, “If Elected, I Promise [_____]”—What Should Judicial Candidates
Be Allowed to Say?, 35 IND. L. REV. 725, 726 (2002) (describing commitments by judicial candidates as “the antithesis of the judicial process”); see also Megan Sloane Gordon & Matthew Edward
Wetzel, The Precarious Balance of Judicial Candidate Speech and Judicial Ethics: The Announce
Clause in the Aftermath of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 613,
618 (2003) (arguing that campaign promises “are completely antithetical to the ideas of neutrality,
unbiasedness, and cold impartiality that inhere to the judiciary”).
222. See Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign Speech by Candidates for Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REV. 207, 214 (1987); see also Morial
v. Judiciary Comm’n, 565 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1977) (describing limitations on judicial candidates’ speech as advancing “[t]he state’s interest in ensuring that judges be and appear to be neither
antagonistic nor beholden to any interest, party, or person”); Adam R. Long, Note, Keeping Mud
Off the Bench: The First Amendment and Regulation of Candidates’ False or Misleading Statements
in Judicial Elections, 51 DUKE L.J. 787, 790 (2001) (“If the citizenry sees judges as politicians
first . . . the public will question the validity and legitimacy of judicial decisions and, in fact, the
judiciary as a whole.”).
223. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1972).
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impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications,
present position, or other fact.”224 By the time the Supreme Court issued its
decision in White, states with elected judges had widely enacted campaign
codes containing variations of these restraints.225 The restrictions were justified as balancing due process’s imperative of judicial impartiality with the
interest in democratic accountability and protection of free speech.226
For many, however, speech restrictions are an imperfect solution to a
more fundamental problem: the very existence of an elected judiciary.227 The
responsiveness to voters expected of legislators and executives is said to be
incompatible with judges’ duty to uphold the rights of unpopular groups and
individuals.228 Substantial evidence exists to support Justice O’Connor’s observation that “[e]lected judges cannot help being aware that if the public is
not satisfied with the outcome of a particular case, it could hurt their reelection prospects.”229 Another criticism is that voters are poorly positioned to
224. Id. Canon 7(B)(1)(c). The Code also imposed restraints on fundraising and involvement
with political organizations. Id. Canon 7(A)(1).
225. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 880 nn.21–22 (8th Cir. 2001), rev’d
on other grounds sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
226. See, e.g., Jason Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning Up Judicial Elections: Examining the First Amendment Limitations on Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV.
71, 84–88 (1997); Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics,
9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1060 (1996). See generally Ferris K. Nesheiwat, Judicial Restraint:
Resolving the Constitutional Tension Between First Amendment Protection of Political Speech and
the Compelling Interest in Preserving Judicial Integrity During Judicial Elections, 24 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 757 (2006).
227. See generally Martin H. Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, The Real Constitutional Problem with
State Judicial Selection: Due Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular Constitutionalism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2014) (arguing against all forms of judicial elections).
228. See White, 536 U.S. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is the business of legislators and
executives to be popular. But in litigation, issues of law or fact should not be determined by popular
vote; it is the business of judges to be indifferent to unpopularity.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Comment,
Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1985, 1988 (1988) (“The paramount function
of courts is to protect social minorities and individual rights. But judges cannot be expected to
perform this countermajoritarian function if their ability to keep their prestigious, highly sought
after positions depends on popular approval of their rulings.”); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian
Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995); Charles
Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 51 (2003); David E. Pozen, The
Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 284 (2008); Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in
the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State Supreme Courts in the Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1997) (comparing the situation of a judge deciding
controversial cases while facing reelection to “finding a crocodile in your bathtub” in that “it’s hard
to think about much else while you’re shaving”); see also Raban, supra note 220, at 214 (offering
examples of statements that judges might make that might be popular but which would threaten the
integrity of the legal system).
229. White, 536 U.S. at 789 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J.
Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election
in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 759, 793–94 (1995) (contrasting the rate of overriding a jury
recommendation of life without parole and imposing the death penalty by judges subject to election
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evaluate the credentials of judicial candidates.230 In a similar vein, it is argued that qualities that make for an effective campaigner largely differ from
those needed of good judges.231
Moreover, scholars worry that campaign contributions to judicial candidates may compromise their independence and impartiality when they ascend to the bench. Critics perceive an unvirtuous cycle in which judicial
candidates solicit contributions from individuals and organizations who in
turn expect favorable rulings from the judges they helped elect.232 Justice
O’Connor expressed this concern as well, further asserting that even “the
mere possibility that judges’ decisions may be motivated by the desire to repay campaign contributors is likely to undermine the public’s confidence in
the judiciary.”233 Substantial data exist to support the inference that the operation of this dynamic extends well beyond possibility to apparent reality.234
with the much greater incidence of overriding a jury recommendation of death in a state where
judges did not stand for election); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and
Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 258 (2004) (finding
an increase in sentences handed down by judges as reelection approaches); Joanna M. Shepherd,
Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 648 (2009); CHRIS W. BONNEAU,
FEDERALIST SOC’Y, A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 7
(2012), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/a-survey-of-empirical-evidence-concerningjudicial-elections (“[T]he evidence is pretty clear . . . that elected judges are responsive to their constituencies when it comes time to make decisions on the bench.”).
230. See Richard A. Posner, Lecture, Judicial Autonomy in a Political Environment, 38 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2006) (“It is completely unrealistic to think that the average voter will ever know
enough about judicial performance to be able to evaluate judicial candidates intelligently.”); Pozen,
supra note 228, at 293.
231. See Douglas D. Birk, Stuck Inside of Minnesota Without Judicial Election Reform Again:
A Contemporary Survey of the Political Movement to Preserve Judicial Impartiality from the Minnesota Judiciary’s Point of View, 32 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 507, 541 (2011) (ascribing to a
district judge the identification of the paradox of “selecting judges by the same process as is used
for other public candidates while expecting distinctly different qualities and attributes in judicial
candidates”); Marie A. Failinger, Can a Good Judge Be a Good Politician? Judicial Elections from
a Virtue Ethics Approach, 70 MO. L. REV. 433, 434 (2005); Laura Denvir Stith & Jeremy Root, The
Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan: The Least Political Method of Selecting High Quality Judges,
74 MO. L. REV. 711, 747 (2009); Nathan Richard Wildermann, Note, Bought Elections: Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 765, 788 (2003).
232. See, e.g., David Barnhizer, “On the Make”: Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the
American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 364–66 (2001); Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge, 3 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C. L. 849, 852–57 (2001);
Penny J. White, Preserving the Legacy: A Tribute to Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico, One Who
Exalted Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 615, 669–72 (2004).
233. White, 536 U.S. at 790 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
234. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 73
(2011) (compiling data indicating that in partisan judicial elections, a positive correlation exists
between the amount of contributions received by a successful candidate and the probability that that
judge will vote in favor of business interests); Shepherd, supra note 229, at 669 (“[Empirical evidence] shows that for judges elected in partisan elections, contributions from various interest groups
have a statistically significant relationship with the probability that judges vote for litigants that the
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Further, the scale of contributions—already a source of public attention when
Justice O’Connor decried its impact235—has only skyrocketed since then.236
This trajectory has been largely fueled by the Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,237 which found that corporate independent campaign expenditures in elections constitute political
speech protected by the First Amendment.238
Commentators also lament that the sharp increase in spending on judicial elections has been accompanied by deterioration in their tone; in the
words of Roy Schotland, they have become “nastier, noisier, and costlier.”239
Attack ads, long a key tactic in political contests, have played an increasingly
prominent part in judicial races.240 A few examples from recent elections
illustrate the edge exhibited by such ads.241
interest groups favor.”); Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 369 (2010) (discussing a study in which “[o]n
average . . . justices ruled in favor of [their] contributors 70 percent of the time”). But see James
Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, Extreme Facts, Extraordinary Case: The Sui Generis Recusal
Test of Caperton v. Massey, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 305, 315 (2010) (finding the evidence of campaign contributions’ influence on judicial decisions “weak[]”).
235. See, e.g., Sheila Kaplan, The Very Best Judges That Money Can Buy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Nov. 29, 1999).
236. See Steele Trotter, Williams-Yulee and the Changing Landscape of Judicial Campaigns,
28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 947, 947 (2015) (noting the dramatic increase in judicial campaign contributions during the 2000s).
237. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
238. Id. at 339–44. See Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV.
1, 30 (2012) (“[I]ndependent expenditures offer a political benefit to candidates that serve as the
quids in a quid pro quo exchange nearly as well as a contribution. When those independent expenditures can be made without restriction in very large amounts, the risk of corruption may even be
greater than the risk from capped contributions.”).
239. Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1081
(2007); see also David W. Earley, When Bathtub Crocodiles Attack: The Timing and Propriety of
Campaigning by Judicial Retention Election Candidates, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 239, 252
(2012) (observing the influence of ugly partisan politics on judicial elections); Jed Handelsman
Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law,
98 GEO. L.J. 1349, 1351 (2010); Scott Michels, Judicial Elections Turn ‘Bitter, Nasty’ and Pricey,
abcNEWS (June 19, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3292991&page=1.
240. See Anthony Champagne, Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV. 669, 673
(2002) (concluding from studies of judicial elections in four states that candidates’ ads “highlight
easily absorbed negative messages about the opponent” (quoting STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE ET AL.,
THE MEDIA GAME: AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE TELEVISION AGE 100 (1993)); Melinda Gann Hall,
Partisanship, Interest Groups, and Attack Advertising in the Post-White Era, or Why Nonpartisan
Judicial Elections Really Do Stink, 31 J.L. & POL. 429, 435–40 (2016). An early, classic instance
of the effective use of such ads was the successful 1986 campaign to remove three justices from the
California Supreme Court. See Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial
Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007,
2038 (1988) (describing the campaign as “a blatant appeal to emotion and desire for revenge”).
241. E.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Candidate Gets Law License Suspension for Attack Ads;
Dissenters Cite Free-Speech Protection, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 9, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judicial_candidate_gets_law_license_suspension_for_attack_ads_dissent-
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An obvious alternative to the perceived ills of judicial elections would
be emulation of the federal system of appointment. Indeed, some commentators have argued that judicial elections inevitably violate due process.242
Barring such an unlikely ruling, however, problems posed by an elected judiciary must likely be addressed through reform rather than abolition. Whatever the deficiencies of judicial elections, they remain highly popular with
the public. Voters across the nation have routinely and decisively rejected
efforts to remove the selection of judges from their hands.243 In particular,
efforts to balance the presumed advantages of appointment with democratic
accountability through the “Missouri Plan”244 have failed to gain traction.
Under this system—also known as merit selection245—a judge is selected by
a high elected official from a list compiled by a nonpartisan nominating commission and then is subject to later unopposed retention elections in which
voters decide whether to retain the judge.246 A number of states besides Missouri have adopted this approach at least in part.247 On the whole, however,
voters have overwhelmingly rejected attempts to introduce this limitation on
their ability to choose judges.248 Indeed, recent years have been marked by
efforts to modify or dismantle merit selection where it already exists.249
ers_se (An ad run in 2014 “showed a robed, faceless judge pouring Jack Daniels whiskey and serving it to children. The voiceover said: ‘Everyone knows that a judge would never serve alcohol to
kids in a courtroom. But appellate judge Tim Cannon did something almost as bad.’”); Richard L.
Hasen & Dahlia Lithwick, Lousy Judgment, SLATE (Oct. 31, 2014, 4:09 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/10/judicial_election_outrageous_ads_campaign_contributions_break_records.html (showing an ad run against judicial candidate in 2014 that asserted candidate said “child pornography is a victimless crime”); A.J. Vicens, 7
Incredibly Sleazy Ads Targeting Judges, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 28, 2014, 10:00 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/videos-sleazy-attack-ads-judicial-elections-darkmoney (showing, inter alia, an ad run against a state supreme court justice asserting that she “[s]ides
with child predators”).
242. See, e.g., Redish & Aronoff, supra note 227, at 2; Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular Justice:
State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 188–89
(1996).
243. See Bopp & Woudenberg, supra note 234, at 307; Unsuccessful Reform Efforts, NAT’L
CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/reform_efforts/failed_reform_efforts.cfm?state= (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
244. See Croley, supra note 228, at 724.
245. See James Bopp, Jr., The Perils of Merit Selection, 46 IND. L. REV. 87, 92 (2013).
246. Id.
247. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 213 (reporting that twenty-three states and the
District of Columbia use either merit selection alone or merit selection in combination with other
methods).
248. See Michael E. DeBow & Brannon P. Denning, Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, the
First Amendment, and the Continuing Campaign to Delegitimize Judicial Elections, 68 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 113, 123–24 (2015), https://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2015/01/Williams-Yulee-v.-The-Florida-Bar-the-First-Amendment-and-the-Continuing-Campaign-to-Delegitimize-Judicial-Elections.pdf; see supra note 213 and accompanying text.
249. See Michael Linton Wright, Comment, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar: Judicial Elections,
Impartiality, and the Threat to Free Speech, 93 DENV. L. REV. 551, 575 (2016).
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B. White’s Application of Strict Scrutiny to Judicial Campaign Speech
The persistent prevalence of electing judges infused the Court’s holding
in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White250 with large import. The statute
challenged in White had forbidden a candidate for judicial office—including
incumbent judges—to “announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.”251 The prohibition encompassed a wide range of expressions,
including criticism of a past court decision while intimating an openness to
overturning that decision.252 To justify the “announce clause,” Minnesota
pointed to two interests that the restriction served: judicial impartiality and
the appearance of judicial impartiality.253 In reviewing the provision, the
Court accepted as “correct” the parties’ stipulation that strict scrutiny was the
pertinent standard.254 This standard was based on the premise that the announce clause was a content-based restriction of speech “at the core of our
First Amendment freedoms” since it concerned the fitness of candidates for
public office.255
While the application of strict scrutiny alone probably doomed the announce clause,256 the Court’s elaboration of its rationale portended broader
threats to limitations on judicial campaign speech. Under the First Amendment, as construed by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in White, the fact that
judicial campaigns involve elections far exceeds in importance the result that
the officials chosen are judges.257 It is true that the Court disclaimed an intent
to “assert []or imply that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative office.”258 Viewed in the
context of the Court’s full opinion, however, this disavowal should be seen
as a slight qualification of the Court’s application of principles governing
political speech to judicial elections. Responding to Justice Ginsburg’s contention that the distinctive character of the judiciary warrants special latitude
250. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
251. Id. at 768 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)).
252. Id. at 772.
253. Id. at 775.
254. Id. at 774. Justice Kennedy was prepared to go even further and apply a rule of per se
invalidity to such a content-based restriction falling outside established exceptions. Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The political speech of candidates is at the heart of the First Amendment,
and direct restrictions on the content of candidate speech are simply beyond the power of government to impose.”).
255. Id. at 774 (majority opinion) (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854,
861, 863 (8th Cir. 2001)).
256. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1451 (2d ed. 1988) (“When
expressed as a standard for judicial review, strict scrutiny is . . . ‘strict’ in theory and usually ‘fatal’
in fact.” (quoting Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972))).
257. White, 536 U.S. at 781–84.
258. Id. at 783.
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to regulate judicial candidates’ speech,259 Justice Scalia accused her of
“greatly exaggerat[ing] the difference between judicial and legislative elections.”260 For the majority, the operative principle was the inextricability of
elections and unhindered political speech.261 Thus, the state could not
“leav[e] . . . elections in place while preventing candidates from discussing
what the elections are about”262; rather, it was “imperative that [candidates
for public office] be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current public importance.”263
The operation of strict scrutiny was rendered even more potent by the
Court’s conception of the state’s asserted interest in preserving the impartiality of its judges. As Justice Scalia explained, impartiality in this sense meant
“lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding.”264 The announce
clause was not narrowly—or even appreciably—tailored to serve this interest
because it “does not restrict speech for or against particular parties, but rather
speech for or against particular issues.”265 While the Court was willing to
entertain a second meaning of impartiality—“lack of preconception in favor

259. Justice Ginsburg, joined by the other three dissenters, argued that because “judges perform
a function fundamentally different from that of the people’s elected representatives,” judicial elections need not possess “all the trappings of legislative and executive races.” Id. at 803, 808 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). A state was therefore entitled to place limitations on judicial campaign speech
impermissible in other kinds of elections to buttress judges’ obligation to keep above “the partisan
fray.” Id. at 807. Justice Stevens, also writing for all the dissenters, likewise accused the majority
of ignoring the “fundamental distinction between campaigns for the judiciary and the political
branches.” Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He believed the Court had underestimated the state’s
interest in “judicial independence and impartiality” and wrongly equated judicial candidates’ freedom to comment on public issues with that of political candidates. Id.; see also Briffault, supra
note 6, at 184 (“If campaign practices that are unexceptionable (or even constitutionally protected)
in the context of legislative or executive elections have a distinct and harmful impact on the judicial
function, then they can be restricted in judicial election campaigns.”).
260. White, 536 U.S. at 784 (majority opinion).
261. See id. at 788 (“If the State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the
democratic process, it must accord the participants in that process . . . the First Amendment rights
that attach to their roles.” (alteration in original) (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991)
(Marshall, J., dissenting))); see also id. at 792 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“If the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges.”).
262. Id. at 788 (majority opinion); see also id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Minnesota
may not . . . censor what the people hear as they undertake to decide for themselves which candidate
is most likely to be an exemplary judicial officer.”).
263. Id. at 781–82 (majority opinion) (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962));
see also id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The State may not regulate the content of candidate
speech merely because the speakers are candidates.”); Alan B. Morrison, The Judge Has No Robes:
Keeping the Electorate in the Dark About What Judges Think About the Issues, 36 IND. L. REV. 719,
736 (2003) (“If the voting public is to make reasoned choices [about judicial candidates], it should
have more rather than less information than [current restrictions allow].”).
264. White, 536 U.S. at 775 (majority opinion) (emphasis omitted).
265. Id. at 776 (emphasis omitted).
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of or against a particular legal view”—the announce clause’s effort to promote this interest failed the other prong of strict scrutiny.266 Such a tabula
rasa quality was neither attainable nor desirable, much less compelling; any
candidate worthy of the judiciary will have considered legal issues sufficiently to have formed opinions on them.267 By extension, the state’s asserted
interest in maintaining the appearance of this brand of impartiality also did
not qualify as a compelling interest.268 Finally, the Court dispensed with assessing impartiality as openness to entertaining views opposed to the judge’s
preconceptions because it did not believe that the Minnesota Supreme Court
had adopted the announce clause for this purpose.269 Rather, the breadth of
settings in which judges could still state their views—including judicial opinions, writings, lectures, and instruction—left the clause’s restriction “so woefully underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous.”270
C. Responses to White
Reaction to White’s implications for other restrictions on judicial campaign speech varied among scholars, states, and—to a lesser extent—courts.
One leading scholar believed that existing limitations of narrower scope and
weightier justification than the announce clause remained valid in the wake
of White.271 A number of other commentators also voiced some level of confidence that the Court had not dealt a fatal blow to these restrictions.272 Particular optimism was expressed about the prospects of the pledges or promises clause,273 which forbids “pledges or promises of conduct in office other
than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office.”274 At
the same time, some observers took a more ominous view of the future of

266. Id. at 777 (emphasis omitted).
267. See id. at 777–78.
268. Id. at 778.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 780.
271. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 209–33.
272. See, e.g., Francisco R. Maderal, Regulating Judicial Campaign Speech: Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White on Remand, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 809, 817–19 (2006); Barbara E. Reed,
Tripping the Rift: Navigating Judicial Speech Fault Lines in the Post-White Landscape, 56 MERCER
L. REV. 971, 972 (2005); Tobin A. Sparling, Keeping up Appearances: The Constitutionality of the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct’s Prohibition of Extrajudicial Speech Creating the Appearance of
Bias, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 444–45 (2006).
273. See, e.g., Moerke, supra note 6, at 310 (describing the future of the clause as “fairly
bright”).
274. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2004).
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such restraints.275 Revisions of state codes in the period following White similarly reflected diverse assessments of the ruling’s impact. These included
officially acknowledging the decision while leaving restrictions intact,276
swift abrogation of the announce clause,277 narrowing the reach of the commit clause,278 and relaxing279 or simply eliminating280 the pledges or promises
clause. In a kind of averaging of states’ responses, the ABA loosened the
restrictions in its Model Code of Judicial Conduct in the immediate aftermath
of White and then again a few years later.281
In contrast to these mixed responses, lower courts overwhelmingly (if
not uniformly282) invalidated judicial campaign speech restrictions challenged under White. Within just a few years after the ruling, various federal

275. See, e.g., Friedland, supra note 7, at 570–71; Richard L. Hasen, First Amendment Limits
on Regulating Judicial Campaigns, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL,
AND LEGAL STAKES FOR JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 15, 15–16 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007),
276. See, e.g., Brian S. Faughnan & Lucian T. Pera, First Amendment Shock Waves: Will
Court’s New Rules Help Tennessee Judicial Candidates Deal with Aftershocks of ‘White’ Decision?, TENN. B.J., June 2006, at 14, 20–21, 27 (describing Tennessee’s replacing commentary of,
but not text of, state’s commit clause); Rick A. Johnson, Judicial Campaign Speech in Kentucky
After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 347, 383–84 (2003) (quoting
memorandum of Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission asserting that White did not affect state’s
canon on judicial statements).
277. E.g., Amendment of Canon 7(B)(1)(c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 571 Pa. xxxvii
(2002).
278. See, e.g., CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5(B)(1) & advisory committee’s cmt.
(1996) (amended 2003) (retaining prohibition on candidates’ statements “that commit the candidate . . . with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the courts” but
rescinding ban on statements that “appear to commit” the candidate in these ways).
279. See, e.g., Approval of Amendments to the Tex. Code of Judicial Conduct, No. 02-9167
(Tex. Aug. 22, 2002), http://www.txcourts.gov/All_Archived_Documents/SupremeCourt/AdministrativeOrders/miscdocket/02/02916700.pdf (replacing ban on pledges or promises regarding judicial duties “other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office” with prohibition regarding “pending or impending cases, specific classes of cases, specific classes of
litigants, or specific propositions of law that would suggest to a reasonable person that the judge is
predisposed to a probable decision in cases within the scope of the pledge”).
280. See, e.g., Order Amending Preamble to Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct (Ga. Jan. 7,
2004), http://www.gasupreme.us/rules/amendments-to-rules/jqc_7_27_or/ (deleting Georgia’s
pledges or promises clause); N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (amended 2006),
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/JudicialStandards/Documents/AmendmentsNCJudicialCode.pdf.
281. See Stern, supra note 6, at 77–78.
282. See, e.g., Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 715–17 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding, inter alia,
Indiana’s “commits clauses”).
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courts struck down the commit clause,283 the pledges or promises clause,284
the solicitation clause,285 the partisan activities clause,286 and the misrepresent
clause.287 Decisions by the highest courts of Florida288 and New York289 upholding restrictions departed from this pattern; however, the decisions’ questionable status as outliers was compounded by the potential bias inherent in
ruling on canons that the courts themselves had issued.290
III. CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES OF THE MISREPRESENT CLAUSE
In the ABA’s current formulation, the misrepresent clause forbids judicial candidates to “knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, make
any false or misleading statement.”291 The incorporation of defamation’s actual malice requirement292 is obviously designed to shield this prohibition
from First Amendment attack. That strategy is consistent with the reasoning
of courts that have invalidated state misrepresent clauses for setting excessively low thresholds of intent.293 Under the logic, principles, and themes
that animate Alvarez and White, however, even this barrier to liability appears
to fall short of the protection required by the Court.

283. E.g., Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083
(D. Alaska 2005), vacated and remanded in part, 504 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007); Kan. Judicial Watch
v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1228–34 (D. Kan. 2006), vacated as moot sub nom. Kan. Judicial
Review v. Stout, 562 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2009); Family Tr. Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345
F. Supp. 2d 672, 696–704 (E.D. Ky. 2004); N.D. Family All., Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021,
1042 (D.N.D. 2005).
284. E.g., Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1083; Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1228–34; Wolnitzek, 345
F. Supp. 2d at 696–704; Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 1042.
285. E.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 763–66 (8th Cir. 2005); Weaver
v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2002); Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1235–38.
286. E.g., Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 88–90
(N.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003).
287. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1319–22.
288. In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 86–87 (Fla. 2003) (upholding commit clause and pledges or
promises clause).
289. In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 5–8 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (upholding pledges or promises
clause); In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1290–93 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (upholding political activities clause).
290. See In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 1994); Rules Governing
Judicial Conduct, STATE OF N.Y. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Legal.Authorities/rgjc.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
291. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.1(A)(11) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (footnote omitted).
292. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
293. See infra notes 295–304 and accompanying text.
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A. The Misrepresent Clause in the Courts
Even before the ruling in White cast doubt over restrictions on judicial
campaign speech, the putatively sturdy misrepresent clause294 encountered
setbacks in court. Once armed with the strict scrutiny prescribed by White,
challenges unsurprisingly increased in potency. The protection accorded falsity by Alvarez rendered states’ misrepresent clauses still more vulnerable to
litigation over their validity. Yet, even recent decisions have generally continued to focus on flaws in legislative draftsmanship rather than question the
state’s underlying ability to penalize judicial campaign speech officially
branded untrue.
A harbinger of the wider trouble the misrepresent clause would face arrived two years before White in cases decided in three states. In In re
Chmura,295 the Michigan Supreme Court declared overbroad a canon stating
that a candidate for judicial office:
should not use or participate in the use of any form of public communication that the candidate knows or reasonably should know is
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to
make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading, or which is likely to create an unjustified expectation about the
results the candidate can achieve.296
The court found that the canon chilled “core political speech” because
its ban was not limited to statements “bear[ing] on the impartiality of the
judiciary,” reached not only false statements but also statements deemed
“misleading or deceptive,” and “extend[ed] beyond the candidate’s actual
statement to permit discipline for factual omissions.”297 To save the statute,
the court narrowly construed it to provide that a judicial candidate “should
not knowingly, or with reckless disregard, use or participate in the use of any
form of public communication that is false.”298
A few months later, the federal district court in Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission299 relied on Chmura as “well reasoned and persuasive authority”300 in disapproving of an Alabama canon that in part barred
judicial candidates from publishing “true information about a judicial candidate or an opponent that would be deceiving or misleading to a reasonable

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000).
Id. at 36 (quoting MICH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(d) (1974)).
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
111 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
Id. at 1233.
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person.”301 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Alabama and invited
the court to consider whether the prohibitions violated the First Amendment.302 Quoting extensively from the federal district court’s opinion, the
Alabama court ruled the canon not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interest in protecting the integrity of the judiciary.303 Accordingly, the state
court narrowed the canon to exclude the reference to deceptive or misleading
statements and prohibit only “demonstrably false information” about a judicial candidate or an opponent disseminated with actual malice.304
Less than a month after Butler was decided, the district court in Weaver
v. Bonner305 struck down a Georgia canon that in part barred judicial candidates from engaging in public communication that “the candidate knows or
reasonably should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to
make the communication considered as a whole not materially misleading.”306 Like the district court in Butler, the court in Weaver was persuaded
by and drew heavily from the Michigan Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Chmura.307 The court determined that the Georgia canon failed for overbreadth because its prohibition was not confined to “false statements that are
knowingly made.”308 Rather, the proscription also encompassed “misleading, deceptive, and fraudulent statements”; “statements containing material
misrepresentations of fact or law”; and “statements that omit a fact necessary
to make the communication considered as a whole not materially misleading.”309 Indeed, the canon’s scope was ruled so far beyond permissible

301. Id. at 1227 (quoting ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7(B)(2) (1998)). The prohibition in full forbade candidates to:
Post, publish, broadcast, transmit, circulate, or distribute false information concerning a
judicial candidate or an opponent, either knowing the information to be false or with
reckless disregard of whether the information is false; or post, publish, broadcast, transmit, circulate, or distribute true information about a judicial candidate or an opponent that
would be deceiving or misleading to a reasonable person.
Id. (quoting ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7B(2) (effective Jan. 1, 1998)).
302. Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 245 F.3d 1257, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2001).
303. Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 802 So. 2d 207, 217–18 (Ala. 2001).
304. Id. at 218.
305. 114 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th
Cir. 2002).
306. Id. at 1339 (quoting GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(d)).
307. See id. at 1342–43.
308. Id. at 1342.
309. Id. Further aggravating the canon’s overbreadth was its prohibition of “statements likely
to create an unjustified expectation about results the candidate can achieve . . . [regardless of]
whether [the statements] are made knowingly or negligently.” Id.
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bounds that it could not be rehabilitated by a narrowing construction without
wholesale judicial revision of its text.310
The Supreme Court’s later ruling in White furnished support for the approach taken in Weaver. Indeed, less than two months after White was
handed down, the Eleventh Circuit pointed to the Court’s decision in confirming the invalidity of the Georgia canon at issue.311 In the eyes of the
Eleventh Circuit, White “suggests that the standard for judicial elections
should be the same as the standard for legislative and executive elections.”312
Accordingly, the court looked to Brown v. Hartlage313 in adopting strict scrutiny for regulation of judicial candidates’ campaign speech314 and the actual
malice requirement for their false expression.315 Georgia’s restriction failed
this standard because it prohibited false statements negligently made and true
statements that were misleading or deceptive, thus depriving candidates of
the “breathing space” mandated by the First Amendment.316 The Eleventh
Circuit’s holding, however, did not trigger an immediate avalanche of invalidated bans on false or misleading judicial campaign speech. A year after
Weaver, the Florida Supreme Court upheld discipline of a judicial candidate
for misrepresenting her incumbent’s revocation of a criminal defendant’s
bond.317 Later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court deadlocked on a 3-3 vote over
whether an incumbent judge’s allegedly false campaign advertisement was
protected under White.318 Still, the stage was set for the Court’s ruling in
Alvarez to give further impetus to challenges to prohibitions on false judicial
campaign speech.
While Alvarez is sometimes invoked in disciplinary proceedings for untruthful speech, its impact on these cases has been mixed. A federal district
court recently drew on Alvarez in striking down an Ohio rule whose ban
reached judicial campaign speech “that is not false and not even obviously
misleading.”319 Hence, the rule clashed with the principle articulated by Justice Kennedy in Alvarez that the Constitution “stands against the idea that we
310. See id. at 1343 (declining to remove problematic negligence language).
311. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002).
312. Id. at 1321.
313. 456 U.S. 45 (1982); see supra notes 73–88 and accompanying text.
314. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1319.
315. Id. at 1319, 1321.
316. Id. at 1319 (citing Brown, 456 U.S. at 61).
317. In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 82–83 (Fla. 2003).
318. Compare In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 784 N.W.2d 631, 647
(Wis. 2010) (Prosser, Roggensack, & Ziegler, JJ.) (finding that advertisement was protected under
White), with In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 784 N.W.2d 605, 630 (Wis.
2010) (Abrahamson, C.J., Bradley & Crooks, JJ.) (concluding that advertisement was subject to
discipline).
319. O’Toole v. O’Connor, No. 2:15-cv-1446, 2016 WL 4394135, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 18,
2016).
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need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.”320 Similarly striking down Ohio’s ban on
a particular species of misleading campaign speech,321 the Ohio Supreme
Court prominently featured (as controlling322) the Alvarez plurality’s stringent review of content-based restrictions.323 By contrast, the Sixth Circuit
during this same period ignored Alvarez while finding one Kentucky rule unenforceable as to the candidate in question and another facially invalid. In
Winter v. Wolnitzek,324 the court ruled constitutional a clause barring a judge
or judicial candidate from “‘knowingly’ or ‘with reckless disregard for the
truth’ making any ‘false [ ] statements’ during a campaign”325; its application
was invalid in this instance, however, because the candidate’s allegedly false
statement could plausibly be construed as true.326 Meanwhile, the state’s ban
on candidates’ misleading statements failed altogether because “only a ban
on conscious falsehoods satisfies strict scrutiny.”327 In Attorney Grievance
Commission of Maryland v. Stanalonis,328 Maryland’s high court also did not
rely on Alvarez in dismissing a charge against the defendant for false campaign speech.329 Because the suit focused on whether Stanalonis had acted
with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of his statement rather than the
pertinent rule’s validity,330 however, the omission was entirely understandable.
Unsurprisingly, courts upholding disciplinary action for false campaign
speech since Alvarez tend to tacitly or expressly deny the relevance of the
Court’s decision to that action. In In re Parish,331 the Review Department of
California’s Bar Court made no reference to Alvarez while determining that
Parish was accountable for making a false allegation against his opponent.332
The Ohio Supreme Court in Disciplinary Council v. Tamburrino333 likewise

320. Id. at *12 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (plurality opinion)
(citing GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (Centennial ed. 2003) (1949))).
321. The canon barred using the title of an office not currently held by a judicial candidate “in
a manner that implies that the judicial candidate does currently hold that office.” O’Neill v. Crawford, 132 Ohio St. 3d 1472, 1472 (Ohio 2016) (quoting OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
4.3(C)).
322. See supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text.
323. See O’Neill, at 1472.
324. 834 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2016).
325. Id. at 693 (alteration in original) (quoting KY. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(B)(1)(c)).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 694.
328. 445 Md. 129, 126 A.3d 6 (2015).
329. Id. at 146, 126 A.3d at 16.
330. See id. at 145–46, 126 A.3d at 15–16.
331. No. 12-o-15242, 2015 WL 514334 (Review Department State Bar Ct. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015).
332. Id. at *1.
333. No. 2016-0858, 2016 WL 7116096 (Ohio Dec. 7, 2016).

2018]

JUDICIAL CANDIDATES’ RIGHT TO LIE

813

did not mention Alvarez when sustaining a sanction for violating a rule forbidding judicial candidates from disseminating false information about an
opponent with actual malice.334 The omission was clearly conscious; the dissent twice pointed to Alvarez in objecting that Tamburrino’s statements were
susceptible to truthful interpretations.335 Finally, the District Court of Montana recently rejected a disciplined candidate’s attempted reliance on Alvarez
on the ground that the decision’s reasoning did not apply to judicial elections.336
B. The Inherent Invalidity of the Misrepresent Clause
The thrust of the misrepresent clause, whatever the provision’s variations among states, is to forbid judicial candidates from knowingly or recklessly making false campaign statements. However laudable the goals of this
prohibition, it is hard to reconcile with the premises of White and Alvarez or
with broader First Amendment principles from which these decisions draw.
While lower courts have faulted deficient wording to overturn canons barring
falsity,337 the entire enterprise may be futile under the Court’s jurisprudence
in this area. Several themes emerge that render such bans precarious.
1. Rejection of Judicial Uniqueness
The outburst of criticism that greeted White from some quarters focused
in large part on the Court’s asserted failure to recognize crucial distinctions
between judicial and legislative elections.338 In doing so, critics echoed objections by the dissenters in White.339 The position criticized by scholars and
dissenting Justices, of course, represents prevailing doctrine in this field. Although the White majority professed to “neither assert nor imply that the First
Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those
for legislative office,”340 the remainder of the opinion dilutes the significance
of this isolated disclaimer. Similarly, while the Court later sustained an otherwise impermissible limitation on judicial campaign finances,341 the special

334. See id. at *3 (setting forth OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, r. 4.3(A)).
335. Id. at *13, *16 (French, J., dissenting).
336. Myers v. Thompson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1140–41 (D. Mont. 2016).
337. See supra notes 165–184 and accompanying text.
338. See, e.g., Margaret H. Marshall, Address, Dangerous Talk, Dangerous Silence: Free
Speech, Judicial Independence, and the Rule of Law, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 455, 467–68 (2002) (arguing that White “confuses judicial accountability with a politician’s accountability”); White, supra
note 232, at 624, 635–36.
339. See supra note 259.
340. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002).
341. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015) (upholding rule barring judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds).
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dynamics of that context limit the holding’s reach.342 Arguments relying
upon judicial exceptionalism thus appear to offer scant support for the misrepresent clause.
The Court’s opinion in White culminates with a declaration of its core
thesis: “If the State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of
the democratic process, it must accord the participants in that process . . . the
First Amendment rights that attach to their roles.”343 Throughout the opinion,
the Court assumed and insisted that First Amendment principles governing
democratic elections transcend the settings in which they take place.344 In
the same vein, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence employed language that could
just have readily applied to the election of legislators:
What Minnesota may not do, however, is censor what the people
hear as they undertake to decide for themselves which candidate is
most likely to be an exemplary judicial officer. Deciding the relevance of candidate speech is the right of the voters, not the State.
The law in question here contradicts the principle that unabridged
speech is the foundation of political freedom.345
Indeed, the dissenting Justices vainly protested that the Court’s reliance
on decisions like Brown involving nonjudicial contests was “manifestly out
of place.”346
Nor was White’s vigorous protection of judicial campaign speech rooted
only in its sweeping view of the scope of First Amendment standards governing electoral expression. In particular, the Court thought the distinctions
between judicial and legislative officials insufficient to extend fewer safeguards to judicial campaign speech.347 Rather, the Court regarded the resemblance of the judicial to the legislative function as grounds for subjecting
elections to these offices to the same fundamental principle of democratic
accountability.348 Though in different ways, both kinds of officials forge
state law; “[n]ot only do state-court judges possess the power to ‘make’ common law, but they have the immense power to shape the States’ constitutions

342. See infra Part IV.B.
343. White, 536 U.S. at 788 (alteration in original) (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349
(1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
344. See supra notes 254–255 and accompanying text; see also Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutionalizing Judicial Ethics: Judicial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Caperton, and Citizens United, 64 ARK. L. REV. 1, 33 (2011) (“Once the state decides to have elections,
that decision carries with it a certain amount of baggage. Part of the baggage is the First Amendment. The state should not be able to take the politics out of politics.”).
345. White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
346. Id. at 806–07 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
347. Id. at 783 (majority opinion).
348. Id. at 783–84.
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as well.”349 Accordingly, as with legislative candidates, voters are entitled to
learn the views and predilections of those who would govern from the
bench.350
White’s discounting of the distinction between judges and legislators
leaves the misrepresent clause peculiarly vulnerable to attack. If Alvarez implicitly confirms that candidates for legislative seats cannot be held to account for their dishonesty,351 then a conception of judges and legislators as
performing similar functions should confer a comparable immunity on judicial candidates. After all, the vice of lying and virtue of truth-telling do not
alter their status when transplanted from the legislative to the judicial realm.
On the contrary, there exists “a public interest in the honesty of all elected
officials and in the public’s confidence in the honesty of all those in
power.”352
2. The (Limited) Value of Honesty
Even putting aside comparisons with nonjudicial officials, it is not at all
clear that curbing dishonesty by judicial candidates constitutes a sufficiently
weighty interest to justify its suppression. The White Court was willing to
recognize as compelling only the state’s interest in preserving a narrowly
confined form of impartiality.353
While White did not present an occasion for the Court to assess the
state’s interest in banning false campaign speech, the opinion’s skeptical tone
toward restrictions on such speech augurs poorly for the misrepresent
clause.354 Although false or misleading speech reflects poorly on the character of a judicial candidate, its bearing on the candidate’s capacity to render
impartial decisions is highly speculative. History offers ample examples of
exceedingly capable office holders whose dubious past practices would not

349. Id. at 784.
350. See id. at 781–82 (“The role that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more
imperative that they be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current public importance.” (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962))); see also Dimino, supra note 217,
at 363 (“The fact that judges do use their policy preferences to shape the law . . . makes it critical,
from a democratic perspective, that the public be aware of the policy orientations of the judges it
selects.”).
351. See supra Part I.B.2.
352. Briffault, supra note 6, at 220. Cf. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410, 429–31 (1993) (striking down ban on distribution of “commercial” publications through newsracks on public property because non-commercial publications caused comparable harms to asserted
government interests).
353. See supra notes 264–265 and accompanying text.
354. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781–82 (2002).
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have anticipated such a career.355 As already suggested, for example, it
would be difficult to trace a systematic correlation between the veracity of
presidential candidates and their success in office once elected.356 In any
event, Alvarez instructs not only that the state may not punish falsity qua falsity, but also that the First Amendment presumes that the appropriate response to false speech is counterspeech rather than censorship.357
Alvarez did recognize government’s power to prohibit falsity associated
with a specific harm, but the harms invoked to support the misrepresent
clause appear no more able to sustain that ban than were the injuries cited in
Alvarez to justify the Stolen Valor Act. There, the government unsuccessfully argued that statements proscribed by the SVA “compromised and frustrated” the “integrity and purpose” of the Congressional Medal of Honor.358
Similarly, courts upholding the misrepresent clause have typically pointed to
the interest in avoiding damage to the courts’ integrity and its perception by
the public.359 If anything, however, this interest seems less palpable—and
less connected to the statute’s ban—than the SVA’s goal of “‘recognizing
and expressing gratitude [through military medals] for acts of heroism and
sacrifice in military service,’” and ‘“foste[ring] morale, mission accomplishment and esprit de corps’ among service members.”360 It has also been suggested that the misrepresent clause can be understood as a means of averting
the harm to informed judicial elections wrought by candidates’ falsehoods.361
This defense, however, is in tension with the insufficiency of that rationale
in the political realm,362 Alvarez’s prescription of counterspeech to address
ills caused by falsity, and the Court’s broader resistance to paternalistic rationales for restrictions on speech.363

355. See, e.g., DAVID NASAW, THE PATRIARCH: THE REMARKABLE LIFE AND TURBULENT
TIMES OF JOSEPH P. KENNEDY 70–82, 213–37 (2012); RICHARD WINSTON, THOMAS BECKET 53–
195 (1967).
356. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 143–145 and accompanying text.
358. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716 (2012) (plurality opinion).
359. See, e.g., Berger v. Supreme Court, 598 F. Supp. 69, 75 (S.D. Ohio 1984); see also In re
Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 960 (Ind. 1999) (“[T]he ability of judges to provide litigants due process
and due course of law is directly and unavoidably affected by the way in which candidates campaign
for judicial office.”); In re Nadeau, 914 A.2d 714, 720 (Me. 2007) (“The Canon is designed to
maintain and enhance public confidence in an independent, fair and competent judiciary . . . .”).
360. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra note 116, at 37–38).
361. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 221.
362. See supra Part I.A.2.
363. See infra Part III.B.3.
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3. The First Amendment’s Antipaternalism
The aim of ensuring that false speech does not lead citizens to cast unwise votes is laudable, but the misrepresent clause is a constitutionally doubtful means of achieving it. As the Court has explained, “[a] ‘highly paternalistic approach’ limiting what people may hear is generally suspect.”364
Specifically, the Court has deemed “[t]he State’s fear that voters might make
an ill-advised choice” inadequate grounds for restricting speech.365 Even in
the sphere of commercial speech, the Court has rejected the “paternalistic
assumption” that consumers must be shielded from information that the state
fears they will misuse.366 In one case invalidating a restriction on commercial
speech, the Court’s holding rested on the philosophy that “[t]he First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.”367
Granted, the Court’s rulings and pronouncements in these cases have assumed that the commercial speech in question is truthful.368 However, the
Court has long accepted that the distinctive attributes of commercial speech
allow government special latitude to take measures to ensure its accuracy and
clarity that would be impermissible in other realms of expression.369 Campaign speech, lying at the core of First Amendment protection,370 does not
afford government such leeway.
Together, Alvarez and White reflect the principle that it is not for government to dictate what expression citizens are capable of processing. As
Justice Kennedy pointed out in Alvarez, citizens showed themselves capable
of exposing Alvarez’s mendacity without the aid of an official truth commission.371 This anti-paternalistic philosophy acquires heightened force when
applied to judicial campaign speech—expression that the White Court located
“at the core of our First Amendment freedoms.”372 As the Washington Supreme Court stated in striking down a ban on false political advertising, this
type of law impermissibly “assumes the people of this state are too ignorant
or disinterested to investigate, learn, and determine for themselves the truth
364. Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1989) (quoting Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
365. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982).
366. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996) (plurality opinion); accord
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 105 & n.13 (1990) (plurality
opinion).
367. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 375 (2002) (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc.,
517 U.S. at 503).
368. See id. at 374; 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 497; Peel, 496 U.S. at 108.
369. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
370. See supra Part I.A.2.
371. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
372. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (quoting Republican Party
of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861, 863 (8th Cir. 2001)).
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or falsity in political debate, and it is the proper role of the government itself
to fill the void.”373
Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Alvarez recognized that paternalistic justifications for laws may mask less benign motives. History is replete with regimes of censorship based on the state’s self-serving claim that
it must shield its citizens from pernicious falsehoods. Thus, Justice Kennedy’s dark reference to the specter of Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four374
highlights that government’s condescending view of citizens’ capacity for
divining falsehood is not only unnecessary but also dangerous. In addition,
the danger of government overreaching in this area is exacerbated by the
blurry line that can exist between provably false assertions and statements of
belief, speculation, or opinion. The issue of whether a defendant’s statement
amounted to a factually demonstrable defamatory falsehood375 has spawned
legions of cases.376 Of course, many statements can be proven to be definitively false. However, the calculus of interests that gives states latitude to
provide a remedy for harm to private reputation from defamation377 does not
obtain in political debate.378 Similarly, the government’s power to treat what
might be considered commercial puffery as a false claim about a product379
does not extend to dubious statements by political candidates. While judicial
candidates are obviously capable of uttering statements that are false, ceding
to government the power of distinguishing truth from falsity in this arena
poses a risk of tendentious enforcement intolerable under the First Amendment.380

373. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 699 (Wash.
1998); see also List v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 45 F. Supp. 3d 765, 776 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (concluding that a state law barring false statements about a proposed ballot initiative was actuated by
an illegitimate interest in “paternalistically protecting the citizenry at large from ‘untruths’ identified by Government appointees”), aff’d sub nom. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466
(6th Cir. 2016).
374. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
375. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990) (requiring that statement
be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law (citing Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986))).
376. See Joseph H. King, Defamation Claims Based on Parody and Other Fanciful Communications Not Intended to Be Understood as Fact, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 875, 881–907.
377. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345–46 (1974).
378. See supra Part I.A.2.
379. See, e.g., Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 39 (1st Cir.
2000) (allowing false advertising claim to proceed where court concluded that advertisement’s statement that “‘[w]hiter is not possible’ . . . invites consumers to compare [the product’s] whitening
power against either other detergents acting alone or detergents used with chlorine bleach,” and that
it “may be literally false.”).
380. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Public Debate, 1993 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 127, 140 (“The very power to make such determinations [of whether a political
statement is false] invites abuse that could be profoundly destructive to public debate.”).
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4. The Double Bind of Strict Scrutiny
Even assuming the sufficiency of the objectives underlying the misrepresent clause, the ban faces a daunting obstacle in the standard of review it
would have to pass. The manner in which the Court applied strict scrutiny to
strike down Minnesota’s announce clause in White can be readily trained on
the misrepresent clause. On the one hand, the Court faulted the limited scope
of the announce clause’s proscription as grounds for questioning the sincerity
of the state’s professed goal of promoting judicial open-mindedness.381 That
judicial candidates had so many other forums in which to express their views
meant that open-mindedness could not have been the actual purpose being
served by this selective restriction.382 On the other hand, a ban that encompassed these other channels of communication—e.g., books and
speeches383—would surely have failed for overbreadth.
The misrepresent clause is similarly (though not identically) vulnerable
to charges of underinclusiveness whose cure would presumably entail suppressing large swathes of protected speech. A law targeting false and misleading statements by a judicial candidate leaves such statements by the candidate’s supporters untouched, even though they also undermine an informed
electorate and—if condoned by the candidate—judicial integrity. Yet, the
combination of maximum protection for political speech and the presumption
in favor of counterspeech under Alvarez makes highly suspect a wholesale
ban on false and misleading judicial campaign speech. It is true that the Court
has sometimes allowed government to address through a partial ban only a
salient segment of a problem.384 Such latitude, however, exists when the
Court applies the lenient rational relationship standard.385 This type of selectivity has little chance of surviving the heightened scrutiny the Court applies
to restrictions on the content of speech.386
381. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 778–80 (2002).
382. Id. at 780.
383. Id. at 779.
384. See, e.g., McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969) (“[A] legislature need not run the risk of losing an entire remedial scheme simply because it failed . . . to cover
every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.”); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (“[R]eform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of
the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” (citing Semler v. Or. State Bd. of
Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608 (1935))).
385. See McDonald, 394 U.S. at 809; Williamson, 348 U.S. at 491.
386. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 n.4 (1992); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987); Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). A similar
illustration of strict scrutiny trapping a law in the pincer of underinclusiveness and overbreadth can
be found in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). There, the Court found
“wildly underinclusive” a ban on minors’ access to violent video games because testimony relied
on by the state to show that such games stirred feelings of aggression also asserted that exposure to
children’s cartoons on television portraying violence and pictures of guns stimulated similar feelings. Id. at 800–02. Yet the Court itself implicitly acknowledged that a ban encompassing these
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5. Misplaced Reliance on Defamation’s Actual Malice Standard
Both the ABA Model Code387 and some state judicial codes388 limit the
misrepresent clause to false or misleading judicial campaign speech that is
made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. This qualification obviously draws from the level of intent known as actual malice that
public officials389 and public figures390 must demonstrate to recover damages
in libel suits.391 While the actual malice requirement has proved a quite potent barrier to recovery,392 its application to judicial campaign speech may
still offer inadequate protection. Alvarez itself establishes that an actual malice requirement does not automatically confer validity on a prohibition of
false expression; Alvarez’s lie about receiving the Medal of Honor epitomizes actual malice.393
More importantly, the transplantation of even a generally speech-protective standard from its origin in defamation doctrine to judicial campaign
speech ignores critical differences between the two types of expression.394
Most conspicuously, of course, they lie at opposite ends of the hierarchy of
expression. Defamation is one of those “‘historic and traditional categories
long familiar to the bar’ . . . ‘the prevention and punishment of which have

communications would prohibit an unacceptable amount of protected speech. See id. at 801–02
(“California has (wisely) declined to restrict Saturday morning cartoons . . . or the distribution of
pictures of guns.”).
387. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
388. E.g., CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5(B)(1)(b) (2016); see also N.C. State Bar v.
Hunter, No. COA09-1014, 2010 WL 2163362, at *9 (N.C. Ct. App. June 1, 2010) (rejecting defendant’s argument that limitation of state’s misrepresent clause to intentional and knowing misrepresentations of judicial candidate’s identity or qualifications furnished insufficient protection under
First Amendment).
389. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
390. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring); Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SUP. CT.
REV. 267, 275–78 (describing how separate opinions produced this holding).
391. See Tiffany L. Carwile, Note, Stop Restricting Speech and Educate the Public: A Review
of the ABA’s Proposed Campaign Activity Canon of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 15 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1053, 1079 (2007) (asserting that a misrepresent clause confined to the actual
malice standard has “no problem” with constitutionality).
392. See John A. Neuenschwander, Is Fame Ever Fleeting? Contemporary Mission v. New
York Times Co., COMM. & L., June 1990, at 27 (“The constitutionally imposed ‘actual malice’
standard . . . is a most formidable barrier that few plaintiffs ever scale.”).
393. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 713–14 (2012) (plurality opinion).
394. See Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1249–50 (Mass. 2015) (rejecting state’s
attempt to “shoehorn” a statute criminalizing certain false statements about political candidates into
standards governing defamation); In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gableman, 784
N.W.2d 631, 643 (Wis. 2010) (Prosser, Roggensack, & Ziegler, JJ.) (“The Supreme Court’s discussion of false statements in civil defamation cases is not appropriate to engraft onto cases addressing
governmental regulations of political speech.”).
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never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.’”395 Indeed, it is only
the need to assure that libel laws do not deter “speech that matters” that has
prompted the Court to extend a degree of “strategic protection to defamatory
falsehood.”396 By stark contrast, political campaign speech—a category encompassing judicial campaigns under White—occupies the highest tier of
protection under the First Amendment. It should follow, then, that judicial
candidates’ nondefamatory falsehoods receive even greater protection than
the actual malice standard provides.397
This conclusion is bolstered by the differing balance of interests implicated in defamation suits and state suppression of judicial candidates’ alleged
falsehoods. In maintaining a regime of libel law, the state asserts its interest
in “compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation.”398
The state thereby furnishes individuals a mechanism through which they can
vindicate their interest in their good name—an interest that “reflects no more
than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being.”399 When the state provides sanctions for judicial candidates’ misrepresentations, however, it is not helping individuals achieve compensation for
the invasion of a private right. Rather, the state is limiting the exercise of a
fundamental individual right in the service of important but unfocused interests in judicial integrity and an informed electorate.400 Thus, the compelling
alignment between state and individual ends that justifies libel law is absent
from this setting.
6. Intractable Problems of Manageability
While the state has a valid interest in combatting false judicial campaign
speech, that interest does not justify the First Amendment costs entailed by
means of enforcing an outright ban. Sanctions for its violation would inevitably place government in the role of disrupting time-sensitive expression at
the heart of the First Amendment. As a practical matter, a formal charge
395. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (first quoting Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); and then quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)).
396. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341–42 (1974); see also N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (rejecting rule placing on critics of official conduct the burden
of proving the truth of their statements because they might “be deterred from voicing their criticism,
even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it
can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so”).
397. Cf. N.Y. Times, 376 US. at 293 (Black, J., concurring) (arguing that the actual malice requirement does not adequately protect defamatory speech by critics of official conduct because it is
“an elusive, abstract concept”).
398. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348.
399. Id. at 341 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
400. See Fried, supra note 72, at 238 (“[T]he First Amendment precludes punishment for generalized ‘public’ frauds, deceptions, and defamation.”).
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would cast a shadow over a candidate and force a diversion of campaign resources to rebutting the accusation.401 Moreover, the very specter of being
subjected to this sort of proceeding could discourage candidates from engaging in intrinsically protected expression.402 Only the premise—rejected in
White—that ordinary principles governing political speech are suspended for
judicial campaigns403 would validate this degree of interference.
The objection to such a scheme begins with the difficulties, in both principle and practice, of official determinations of the truth or falsity of campaign speech. It is disturbing enough under democratic theory and free
speech doctrine to concede this power to government404—a tension compounded in this context by the danger of partisan abuse by those charged with
responsibility for enforcement.405 The problem is vastly exacerbated, however, by the processes of proof and refutation involved in assessing the truthfulness of a candidate’s statement. The proliferation of libel suits concerning
whether the statement in question can even be reasonably construed as conveying a provably false assertion406 suggests the potential scale of mischief
unleashed by allowing this inquiry in the middle of a political campaign.407
At least in defamation actions ample time is afforded for the defendant’s response, discovery, and a full-blown trial before arriving at a conclusion about
meaning and factual falsity. This luxury is not available in a judicial campaign, and the compressed timetable would threaten to compromise both the
integrity of the outcome and accused candidates’ fair opportunity to conduct
their campaign. Moreover, the impact of the proceeding begs the question of
what relief it might provide. An official designation of the candidate’s statement as false or misleading seems too slight a result to warrant such a massive
intrusion into the campaign, while disqualification before the electorate has
made its decision would be grossly—and likely unconstitutionally—disproportionate to the violation. Intermediate penalties (e.g., fines) are theoretically possible, but it is hard to conceive of how they could be calibrated and
administered in a principled way.

401. See 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 792 (8th Cir. 2014) (“For all practical
purposes, the real potential damage is done at the time a complaint [of alleged falsity in political
advertising or campaign material] is filed.”).
402. See N.Y. Times, 376 US. at 279 (rejecting restriction on speech tending to cause those subject to it to “steer far wider of the unlawful zone” (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526
(1958))).
403. See supra notes 254–255 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text.
405. See Marshall, supra note 39, at 299.
406. See supra notes 375–376 and accompanying text.
407. See Marshall, supra note 39, at 300 (“[T]he availability of a lawsuit [against candidates for
allegedly false statements] could become as much a partisan campaign tactic as the problem it is
designed to address.”).
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An alternative that addresses some of these difficulties but raises others
would be to permit actions against successful candidates who allegedly owe
their victory to campaign misrepresentations. While this approach would enable a more deliberate proceeding than one held in the heat of a campaign, it
would raise vexing issues of proof and finality. Alvarez required that to uphold a ban on falsity, there must be established “a direct causal link between
the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”408 Surely it cannot
be the case that every false utterance by a victorious judicial candidate is
presumed to have tilted the race in that candidate’s favor.409 Thus, the presiding tribunal would need to determine not only whether the statement at
issue was false, but also whether its falsity was decisive to the election’s outcome. No readily apparent method exists for reliably making this determination.
Even if a state were to adopt such a post-election proceeding in the face
of these obstacles, the presumed remedies for violation would impose exorbitant costs. That would, of course, be literally true if the outcome of a violation was invalidation of the election and the launch of a new one. Given
the various expenses involved—as well as the absence of assurance that the
second campaign would not spawn fresh misrepresentations—this seems an
unlikely course. Additionally, even if these concerns were put aside, a larger
one would loom. The institutional instability that would result from having
judicial elections routinely open to doubt would undermine both the judicial
and democratic systems. To a substantial extent, this same consideration applies even to the more modest and arguably more logical remedy of nullifying
the winner’s election and placing his or her opponent in the contested seat.
The prospect of a second chance would virtually invite defeated candidates
to cry foul, thus negating the finality of elections on which effective government depends. The preference voiced in Alvarez for counterspeech as a remedy for false expression,410 then, not only comports with First Amendment
values but also serves the state’s own interests.

408. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725 (2012) (plurality opinion); see also Rodney A.
Smolla, Words “Which By Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury”: The Evolving Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 317, 357–58 (2009)
(Under the marketplace of ideas approach to free speech, “it is incumbent on the government to
defend laws restricting expression by demonstrating that the expression is linked to some extraneous
harm, to some palpable invasion of a legally protected societal or individual interest, such as national security or individual reputation or privacy.”).
409. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 885 (2009) (“[P]roving what ultimately drives the electorate to choose a particular candidate is a difficult endeavor, not likely to
lend itself to a certain conclusion.”).
410. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 726–28.
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IV. THE PERIPHERAL EXCEPTIONS OF CAPERTON AND WILLIAMS-YULEE
Two Supreme Court decisions in the last decade, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.411 and Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,412 arguably throw into
question this Article’s assertion that the misrepresent clause is invalid. In
both cases, the Court upheld restrictions that impinged on judicial campaign
activity.413 In both, the Court “recognized the ‘vital state interest’ in safeguarding ‘public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s
elected judges.’”414 Neither ruling, however, amounts to a challenge to vigorous First Amendment protection of judicial campaign speech under White,
much less to the strict scrutiny under Alvarez for bans on falsity not demonstrably linked to definite harm. Rather, each upholds the state’s ability to
enact narrowly defined measures to address distinctive dangers arising from
judicial campaign contributions.
A. Caperton and Recusal
While rather involved,415 the dispute in Caperton boiled down to the
question of whether Chief Justice Brent Benjamin of the West Virginia Supreme Court should have recused himself in a case involving his chief political benefactor, Don Blankenship. Blankenship was the chairman, CEO, and
President of A.T. Massey Coal Company (“Massey”), which had suffered a
$50 million jury verdict in a suit brought by Hugh Caperton and corporations
that he controlled.416 While the verdict was on appeal, Benjamin was elected
to the West Virginia Supreme Court after a campaign in which Blankenship’s
expenditures on behalf of Benjamin—$3 million—exceeded the total number
of contributions by Benjamin’s other supporters and his campaign committee.417 In response to a series of motions for recusal on Massey’s appeal,
Benjamin repeatedly refused to recuse himself and ultimately cast the decisive vote in a 3-2 decision overturning the jury verdict.418
On Caperton’s appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court
ruled that Benjamin’s involvement in the decision violated due process.419
Key to the outcome was the Court’s application of an objective standard to
determine whether a judge’s participation in a ruling affecting a campaign
donor presents a substantial risk of bias rather than a requirement that actual
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.

556 U.S. 868 (2009).
135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
Id at 1662; Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884–87.
Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666 (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889).
See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872–76.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 873.
Id. at 873–75.
Id. at 885–86.
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subjective bias be demonstrated.420 Thus, the Court would inquire whether
“the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too
high to be constitutionally tolerable.”421 Under this analysis, two principal
considerations—all pointing toward Benjamin’s recusal—would govern
whether a judge should step aside in a case. First, the Court would examine
the scale of the donor’s contribution relative to both the total amount of
money contributed to the campaign and the total amount spent in the election,
as well as the contribution’s apparent role in securing the recipient’s election.422 Also crucial was the compression of relevant events. A contribution
of such magnitude, made during the pendency of the case in question and
followed by the judge’s election, would raise a reasonable perception that the
judge had been influenced by gratitude toward the donor.423 In Caperton, the
combination of these two elements sufficed to “offer[] a possible temptation
to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear
and true.”424
Although Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion took pains to emphasize
the rarity of the circumstances presented in Caperton,425 the four dissenters
argued that the Court had opened the floodgates to a raft of “Caperton motions” by losing parties contending that the judge was probably biased.426 By
failing to articulate a standard for constitutionally compelled recusal, the
Court had virtually invited allegations of bias on a frequent if not routine
basis.427 To underscore the uncertainty sewn by the vague new standard,
Chief Justice Roberts posed forty questions that remained about the reach and
operation of the Court’s ruling.428

420. See id. at 881–84.
421. Id. at 877 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
422. See id. at 884.
423. See id. at 884–86.
424. Id. at 886 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie,
475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986)).
425. See id. at 887 (“The facts now before us are extreme by any measure.”); see also James
Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 293 (2010)
(arguing that Caperton is “correct in its narrowness”).
426. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 899 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 903 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(predicting that the Court’s holding will “add[] to the vast arsenal of lawyerly gambits what will
come to be known as the Caperton claim”).
427. See id. at 890–91 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 902 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (The decision
“create[s] vast uncertainty with respect to a point of law that can be raised in all litigated cases in
(at least) those 39 States that elect their judges.”); see also Daniel Betts, How High Is Too High?:
Judicial Elections and Recusal After Caperton, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 247, 248 (2010) (“[T]he
Caperton Court . . . failed to provide any guidance . . . .”).
428. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 893–98 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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While Caperton undoubtedly upset settled doctrine governing due process requirements for judicial qualification,429 its implications for the misrepresent clause are remote if not nonexistent. As grist for challenging the misrepresent clause, Caperton offers merely evidence that the First Amendment
does not categorically discountenance every state restriction concerning judicial campaign activity. Other than this broad and unremarkable proposition, however, there appears little in Caperton that would empower the state
to bar judicial candidates from engaging in false or misleading speech. Even
if grounds for recusal are extended beyond the narrow scope envisioned by
the Caperton majority,430 the brunt of this development would fall on due
process rather than free speech doctrine. This is especially true, of course, if
any potential expansion remains within the Caperton rule’s stated field of
campaign contributions. Indeed, commentators have recognized that the
Court’s decision the following year in the landmark campaign finance case
Citizens United v. FEC431 overwhelmed any modest impact that Caperton
might have in reducing the role of campaign spending.432 Even under speculation that Caperton has some bearing on regulation of judicial campaign
speech,433 however, recusal in a case based on comments made during a campaign is a far cry from punishment for those comments.434 Moreover, regulation of speech aimed at preserving judicial candidates’ impartiality once in
office—however vulnerable since White—stands on a surer footing than attempts to ensure candidates’ honesty.435

429. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification in the Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 247, 248 (2010) (stating that constitutional doctrine of
mandatory disqualification “all changed” in Caperton).
430. See Andrey Spektor & Michael Zuckerman, Judicial Recusal and Expanding Notions of
Due Process, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 977, 994 (2011) (“[E]xpecting lower courts to be selective in
applying the [Caperton] rule in only ‘extreme’ cases is not realistic . . . .”).
431. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
432. See Aviva Abramovsky, Justice for Sale: Contemplations on the “Impartial” Judge in a
Citizens United World, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 713, 729; André Douglas Pond Cummings, Procuring “Justice”?: Citizens United, Caperton, and Partisan Judicial Elections, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL.
89, 102 (2010); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 581, 584 (2011); Adam Liptak et al., Caperton and the Courts: Did the Floodgates Open?, 18
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 495 (2015).
433. See Roy A. Schotland, Caperton Capers: Comment on Four of the Articles, 60 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 337, 344 (2010) (“Litigation about judicial campaign regulation is bound to be affected, in
major ways, by Caperton’s underlying holding.”).
434. See Spektor & Zuckerman, supra note 430, at 1001–02.
435. See supra notes 232–234 and accompanying text.
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B. Williams-Yulee and Solicitation
Conceivable grounds admittedly exist for invoking Williams-Yulee v.
Florida Bar to bolster the misrepresent clause.436 Read in isolation, the
Court’s recognition of the difference between judicial and political elections,
and of the state’s strong interest in protecting public confidence in the nation’s judiciary, furnish potent material for upholding a ban on false statements by judicial candidates.437 Moreover, the Williams-Yulee Court’s accommodating version of strict scrutiny offers additional encouragement to
champions of this prohibition. Viewed in context, however, WilliamsYulee’s pronouncements and analysis do not appear to have a far-reaching
impact on White’s legacy of robust protection for judicial candidates’ campaign speech. Indeed, the opinion pointedly refrains from calling White into
question. Rather, the holding should be understood in the light of distinctive
concerns raised by judicial candidates’ direct solicitation of funds. If the rationale for this restriction overlaps to any appreciable degree with the basis
for other limitations on candidates’ speech, it is with provisions other than
the misrepresent clause.
Williams-Yulee addressed the constitutionality of Florida’s solicitation
clause providing that judicial candidates “shall not personally solicit campaign funds . . . but may establish committees of responsible persons” to raise
money for election campaigns.438 As a candidate for a county court seat,
Williams-Yulee (“Yulee”) had violated this prohibition by mailing and posting online a letter soliciting contributions to her campaign.439 The Florida
Supreme Court rejected Yulee’s challenge to her reprimand and fine, concluding that the ban on candidates’ solicitation advanced the state’s compelling interest in “preserving the integrity of [its] judiciary and maintaining the
public’s confidence in an impartial judiciary,”440 and was narrowly tailored
to that interest because it “insulate[s] judicial candidates from the solicitation
and receipt of funds while leaving open, ample alternative means for candidates to raise the resources necessary to run their campaigns.”441
In affirming the Florida court’s judgment, the Supreme Court approvingly noted the interests that that court had articulated to support the ban.442
For the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Roberts, it was “intuitive” for
436. See Myers v. Thompson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1141–42 (D. Mont. 2016) (applying principle of Williams-Yulee in dismissing action under First Amendment for injunctive relief against
enforcement of state’s ban on false statements by judicial candidates).
437. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015).
438. Id. at 1663 (quoting FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(C)(1)).
439. Id.
440. Id. at 1664 (alteration in original) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d 379,
384 (Fla. 2014)).
441. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d at 387).
442. Id. at 1666.
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Florida and other states to respond in this way to the prospect that “the public
may lack confidence in a judge’s ability to administer justice without fear or
favor if he comes to office by asking for favors.”443 Explaining the validity
of a ban presumably unacceptable in legislative and executive elections,
Chief Justice Roberts affirmed that “States may regulate judicial elections
differently than they regulate political elections, because the role of judges
differs from the role of politicians.”444 Because the judiciary is the branch
most dependent on public respect for its authority, public perception of judicial integrity is “a state interest of the highest order.”445
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged, however, that the judiciary’s distinctive character did not warrant suspension of ordinary First Amendment
principles,446 and that therefore strict scrutiny applied to this restriction on
judicial candidates’ speech.447 Although few speech restrictions could survive this exacting review,448 the narrowly tailored means through which the
solicitation clause advanced the state’s compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity made this one of those “rare
cases.”449 In particular, the Court first dismissed Yulee’s contention that the
ban was underinclusive because it allowed activity inflicting comparable
harm on judicial integrity and its appearance: e.g., solicitation of money by a
judge’s campaign committee.450 Rather than insist that the state comprehensively address each possible threat to this interest, it sufficed that the ban
“aims squarely at the conduct most likely to undermine public confidence in
the integrity of the judiciary: personal requests for money by judges and judicial candidates.”451 The Court also rejected Yulee’s argument that the restriction swept in too much speech.452 Quite the opposite: The Court detailed
the vast range of means by which judicial candidates could engage their supporters and the public.453 Even the bar to direct requests for money could be

443. Id.
444. Id. at 1667 (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002)); see also
id. at 1662 (“[A] State’s decision to elect its judiciary does not compel it to treat judicial candidates
like campaigners for political office.”).
445. Id. at 1666 (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009)).
446. Id. at 1667 (“[T]he First Amendment fully applies to Yulee’s speech.”).
447. Id. at 1665.
448. Id. at 1665–66 (“We have emphasized that ‘it is the rare case’ in which a State demonstrates
that a speech restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.” (quoting Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion))).
449. Id. at 1666.
450. Id. at 1668.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 1670.
453. Id.
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largely circumvented by delegating this function to committees.454 Moreover, any effort to selectively ban candidates’ solicitation according to whether
a particular mode threatened the state’s interests would be unworkable.455 Finally, the Court found similarly unfeasible Yulee’s proposal of recusal rules
that would remove from cases judges who might be compromised by a
party’s or attorney’s contributions.456 A liberal recusal policy would trigger
a “flood of postelection recusal motions” and spur calculating litigants to
make campaign contributions for the very purpose of later forcing recipients
to recuse themselves.457
With differences aired by both the concurrence and the dissents, Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion was criticized at once for being too hard and too
lenient on judicial campaign speech restrictions. For her part, Justice Ginsburg renewed her argument from her dissenting opinion in White458 for more
authority by states to regulate judicial campaigns than other types.459 In Williams-Yulee, she expressed particular anxiety about applying to judicial campaigns the same license to spend that the Court’s intervening decisions in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission460 and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission461 had granted in political campaigns.462 Conversely, the four dissenters all accused the Chief Justice of applying a weak
and spurious form of strict scrutiny—most vividly when Justice Alito characterized Florida’s rule as “about as narrowly tailored as a burlap bag.”463

454. Id.
455. Id. at 1671.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 1671–72.
458. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
459. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct.. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). For this reason, Justice
Ginsburg refused to join the portion of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion calling for the application
of strict scrutiny. Id. at 1675 (arguing that rather than having to choose between “equating judicial
elections to political elections” and “abandoning public participation in the selection of judges altogether,” states should be permitted to “balance the constitutional interests in judicial integrity and
free expression within the unique setting of an elected judiciary” (quoting Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 821 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))).
460. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
461. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
462. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673–75.
463. Id. at 1685 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1677 (Scalia, Thomas, JJ., dissenting)
(attributing the Court’s decision upholding the ban on solicitation to “applying the appearance of
strict scrutiny” (emphasis added)); id. at 1685 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court’s
opinion creates a blueprint for “eviscerating strict scrutiny any time the Court encounters speech it
dislikes”).
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If perhaps somewhat overstated,464 the dissenters’ objections were not
without foundation.465 At minimum, the Court seized upon a relatively generous formulation of strict scrutiny, plucking from an earlier opinion upholding a restriction subject to strict scrutiny the assertion that a limitation on
speech need not be “perfectly tailored” to its objective.466 More strikingly,
in deflecting the charge of underinclusiveness with the proposition that “[a]
State need not address all aspects of a problem in one fell swoop,”467 the
Court employed language more closely associated with the permissive rational relationship standard than with strict scrutiny.468 The contrast with
White’s stern application of strict scrutiny469 is difficult to ignore.
Nor does the Court’s analysis in Williams-Yulee square comfortably
with White in other ways. Williams-Yulee’s embrace of shifting notions of
judicial integrity bears little resemblance to the Court’s methodical parsing
of Minnesota’s asserted interest in impartiality in White.470 Additionally, the
state’s stake in preserving the appearance of judicial probity—at best a subsidiary interest in White471—takes center stage in Chief Justice Robert’s justification of the solicitation clause.472 Most fundamentally, the Court’s opinion sharpens the line that had been blurred in White between judges and other
elected officials under the First Amendment. This outlook is captured in the

464. See, e.g., id. at 1676 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court flattens one settled First Amendment principle after another.”).
465. See, e.g., id. at 1679–80 (presenting arguments to show that Florida failed to demonstrate
that its ban restricted no more speech than necessary to achieve state’s goal); see also Clay Hansen
& J. Joshua Wheeler, Free Speech, Elections, and Judicial Integrity in an Age of Exceptionalism,
31 J.L. & POL. 457, 458–64 (2016) (describing the Williams-Yulee Court’s “toothless application of
strict scrutiny”).
466. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1671 (majority opinion) (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504
U.S. 191, 209 (1992) (purality opinion)).
467. Id. at 1668.
468. See supra notes 384–386 and accompanying text; see also City of New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297, 305 (1976) (per curiam) (“[A] ‘statute is not invalid under the Constitution because
it might have gone farther than it did,’ . . . a legislature need not ‘strike at all evils at the same time,’
and . . . ‘reform may take one step at a time . . . .’” (quoting Katzenback v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
657 (1966))).
469. See supra Part II.B.
470. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1677–78 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775–79 (2002).
471. See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 778 (“[S]ince avoiding judicial preconceptions on legal issues
is neither possible nor desirable, pretending otherwise by attempting to preserve the ‘appearance’
of that type of impartiality can hardly be a compelling state interest either.”).
472. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1671 (majority opinion) (“Florida has reasonably determined that personal appeals for money by a judicial candidate inherently create an appearance of
impropriety that may cause the public to lose confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.”); Michael
R. Dimino, Sr., Image is Everything: Politics, Umpiring, and the Judicial Myth, 39 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 397, 398–99 (2016) (contrasting Williams-Yulee’s emphasis on appearance with
White’s roots in “reality”).
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Chief Justice’s blunt declaration that “a State has compelling interests in regulating judicial elections that extend beyond its interests in regulating political elections, because judges are not politicians.”473
Nevertheless, it would be overreading Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
to conclude that it represents a repudiation of White’s underlying principles.
On the contrary, the opinion cites White a half-dozen times. Indeed, Justice
Ginsburg withheld her concurrence from Part II of the opinion for the express
reason that that section endorsed White’s strict scrutiny standard.474 Thus,
Williams-Yulee should be seen rather as implementing White’s reservation of
the possibility that judicial elections could be subject to heightened regulation in certain instances.475
It is easy to see why the Court would recognize solicitation by judicial
candidates as one of those “rare cases.”476 The potential damage to impartiality and the appearance of fairness from candidates asking for money differs in kind from the dangers posed by the speech barred by the announce
clause struck down in White. This may help to account for the presence of
the solicitation clause in the judicial conduct codes of all thirty-nine states
with judicial offices subject to some form of election477; only nine states had
still retained an announce clause when White was decided.478 Prohibition of
judicial candidates’ solicitation provides an unusually manageable remedy to
a distinctive threat to the fact and perception of judicial impartiality.479 Moreover, the concerns animating the solicitation clause bear even less resemblance to the rationale for the misrepresent clause than that of the announce
clause.
The particular dangers posed by candidates directly requesting funds for
their campaigns are even further removed from the evils to which the misrepresent clause are addressed. Personal solicitation by the candidate contains a coercive undertone that a third party’s solicitation does not.480 More
broadly, states may act on the premise that a candidate’s personal solicitation
“creates a categorically different and more severe risk of undermining public

473. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1672. But see id. at 1683 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing
that an incorrect premise of the Court’s decision “is that since judges should be accorded special
respect and dignity, their election can be subject to certain content-based rules that would be unacceptable in other elections”).
474. See id. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
475. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
476. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666 (majority opinion).
477. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (No. 13-1499).
478. Moerke, supra note 6, at 267–68.
479. See David W. Earley & Matthew J. Menendez, Williams-Yulee and the Inherent Value of
Incremental Gains in Judicial Impartiality, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 44–45 (2015).
480. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1669 (“The same person who signed the fundraising letter
might one day sign the judgment.”).
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confidence than does solicitation by a campaign committee.”481 Thus, rather
than granting states a free-float commission to monitor candidates to ensure
their compliance with generalized notions of “integrity,” Williams-Yulee specifically addresses “the regrettable but unavoidable appearance that judges
who personally ask for money may diminish their integrity.”482
Nor does the Court’s opinion amount to a categorical and unreflective
acceptance of judicial exceptionalism. Rather, distinctive and devastating
harm is inflicted on the judiciary’s core mission by “a public perception that
the judiciary is being bought.”483 Citizens accept—if grudgingly—the inevitability that donors to political campaigns will exert outsized influence on
the candidates whom they help to elect. As Williams-Yulee recognized, however, it is an altogether more corrosive effect on a major branch of government when “the public may lack confidence in a judge’s ability to administer
justice without fear or favor [because] he comes to office by asking for favors.”484 Accordingly, the Court noted that “our precedents applying the First
Amendment to political elections have little bearing on the issues here.”485
Even if Williams-Yulee is not quite “much ado about nothing,”486 then,
its limited implications487 do not reach the misrepresent clause. The purpose
of the misrepresent clause includes no counterpart to the potential quid pro
quo of a candidate’s solicitation and the contribution it elicits. Likewise, the
remedy of counterspeech as an alternative to censorship of alleged falsehoods
cannot combat the potential harm to impartiality and its appearance inherent
in candidates’ personal requests for contributions. Nor does a bar to candidates’ solicitation of money go to the heart of content-based restrictions in a

481. Id.
482. Id. at 1667.
483. Earley & Menendez, supra note 479, at 43. The special dangers posed by solicitation have
also influenced other areas of First Amendment doctrine. For example, the substantial measure of
protection given to commercial speech has not extended to instances where targeted solicitation is
thought to present particular hazards. Compare Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626, 647–49 (1985) (striking down prohibition of inclusion of illustrations in attorneys’ advertising), and Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 382 (1977) (invalidating ban on attorney’s
advertising about price of routine legal services), with Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,
620 (1995) (upholding enforcement of prohibition on personal injury lawyers’ sending targeted direct-mail solicitations within thirty days of an accident), and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436
U.S. 447, 449 (1978) (upholding state’s authority to ban in-person solicitation of clients “for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent”).
484. 135 S. Ct. at 1666.
485. Id. at 1667.
486. See Chris W. Bonneau & Shane M. Redman, Much Ado About Nothing: The Irrelevance
of Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar on the Conduct of Judicial Elections, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 31, 31, 41 (2015).
487. See Mark Walsh, A Pragmatic Turn, A.B.A. J., July 2015, at 19, 20 (reporting that experts
on American judicial elections considered the decision narrow).
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way that a blanket ban on falsehoods does. Finally, the appearance of corruption that the solicitation clause is designed to avert—wholly outside the
realm of the misrepresent clause—summons up an abiding principle of law:
“justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”488
V. CONCLUSION
To contend that the Constitution protects dishonesty by judicial candidates is not an exercise in cynicism. Rather, acknowledgement of this protection brings into focus the costs of the widespread practice of choosing
judges by popular vote. Like the rising tide of spending and vitriol that have
infected judicial elections, the license to lie throws into sharp relief the gap
between ideals of justice and realities of politics. It is often observed that
society can be required to pay a heavy price for freedom of speech. Permitting those who would administer the laws of the land to deploy falsehood as
a tactic seems a particularly lamentable byproduct of the First Amendment.
That this price could be avoided by choosing judges through other means
may yet affect the modes of judicial selection.

488. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11,
14 (1954)).

